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ABSTRACT

Legislative redistricting following the 2010 Census kicked up a

deluge of litigation. It did not abate. In several states, redistricting
litigation extended throughout the decade, costing taxpayers millions.
Factors leading plaintiffs to challenge legislative lines are multifaceted;
the reasons redistricting litigation flares (and persists) are complex. One

underexamined question is the extent to which process fairness in
t Professor of Practice and Co-Director of the Election Law Program, William & Mary
Law School. Heartfelt thanks to Professor Pam Karlan for her encouraging and insightful

comments and to Professor Rick Hasen for his helpful feedback. Thanks also to participants
at the AALS Section on Election Law's January 9, 2021 workshop. Special gratitude to
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Elizabeth Depatie '22, Abram Gagnon '22, Brianna Bennett '22, Alex Lipow '22, and
Anthony Scarpiniti '22. All errors and shortcomings are of course my own.
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redistricting impacted redistricting litigation after the 2010 Census. At
least in theory, a transparent redistricting process should produce fairer
maps less likely to be challenged in court. But fights over maps result
from myriad sources-the raw quest for political power, the availability
of legal remedies, and other dynamics that process fairness may be
powerless against. Still, a review of litigation spanning the last decade
reveals that the degree of process transparency did matter in revealing
ways, often figuring prominently in judicial assessments of maps.
Examining the nexus between transparency and redistricting litigation

after the 2010 round provides important insights for line drawers hoping
to avoid (or at least improve their chances in) court.
INTRODUCTION

Every ten years following the release of the U.S. Census,' states are
required to redraw state and federal legislative districts to account for
population changes. 2 State legislatures have traditionally taken up the
task of drawing legislative lines, despite the obvious conflict of interest.3
In a growing number of states, independent or semi-independent
redistricting commissions draw legislative maps.4 Regardless of who
draws the lines, state redistricting processes feature varying degrees of
transparency. 5 In the 2010 round, some line drawers kept the process

secret until just before unveiling their maps. 6 Wisconsin, a poster child
for secretive redistricting in the 2020 round, only allowed members of the
majority party to access deliberations and drafts-and required those who
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring that an apportionment of representatives of the
states must be carried out every ten years). State constitutions bear similar mandates for
districting state legislative seats. See Redistricting Criteria, NAT'L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-

criteria.aspx. The pandemic delayed the 2020 Census, altering state redistricting schedules.
See 2020 Census Delays andthe Impact on Redistricting, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES

(Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2020-census-delays-and-theimpact-on-redistricting-637261879.aspx.
2. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-27 (1962) (holding that courts may enter the
political thicket and require legislatures to redistrict).
3. Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING,

LOYOLA

L.

SCH.,

https://redistricting.lls.edu/redistricting-101/who-draws-the-lines/
(last visited May 10,
2021).
4. In the 2010 round, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and
Washington used independent redistricting commissions with ultimate authority in the hands
of commissioners to approve districts. Independent and Advisory RedistrictingCommissions,
COMMON CAUSE, https://www.commoncause.org/independent-redistricting-commissions/

(last visited May 10, 2021).
5. See Rebecca Green, Redistricting Transparency, 59 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1787,

1793-17 (2018) (describing transparency provisions in state redistricting processes).
6. See id. at 1797-98.
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took part to sign confidentiality agreements. 7 In other states, particularly
but not exclusively those with independent redistricting commissions,

procedural rules required high levels of transparency including full public
access to meetings, documents, and data.'
It has become routine in many states for plaintiffs to challenge
district lines in court.9 Redistricting lawsuits take many forms. Some arise
before lines are finalized, seeking public access to the process or
challenging some aspect of the approach. 10 Once lines are adopted,
partisan or racial gerrymandering claims may ensue." The Voting Rights
Act (VRA) also gives rise to challenges. 12 Or, plaintiffs might argue that

the lines violate the "one person one vote" requirement that districts have
equal population. 13 Sometimes plaintiffs argue the lines violate a state

7. Patrick Marley, Daniel Bice & Jason Stein, Lawmakers Were Made to Pledge Secrecy
(Feb.
6,
2012),
SENTINEL
J.
Redistricting,
MILWAUKEE
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/lawmakers-were-made-to-pledge-secrecy-

over

over-redistricting-9643ep0- 138826854.html/.
8. See Green, supra note 5, at 1805-11 (detailing transparency provisions in states with
independent commissions); see also Creation of Redistricting Commissions, NAT'L CONF.
STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/creation-ofredistricting-commissions.aspx.
9. Richard L. Hasen, What to Expect When You're Electing: Federal Courts and the

PoliticalThicket in 2012, 59 FED. LAW. 34, 34 (2012) (describing how election litigation since
Bush v. Gore in 2000 doubled from "94 cases nationally before 2000 to about 237 cases per
year afterward" and noting that the total includes "dozens of redistricting controversies."); see
also Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand PoliticalCartels, 116 HARV. L. REv. 593, 646

(2002) (noting that a "huge amount of the redistricting in the United States already finds its
way into the courts"). Importantly, not all redistricting plaintiffs have the same goals. See Lisa
Marshall Manheim, Redistricting Litigation and the Delegation of Democratic Design, 93
BOSTON U.L. REv. 563, 571-72 (2013) (critiquing the plaintiffs' motives in redistricting
litigation). In the case of partisans seeking to overturn maps, the impetus may be a raw bid to

recapture political power. See id. at 572. In the case of nonprofit groups pursuing litigation,
the goal might be tied bolstering democratic institutions and/or to interests of funders. See id.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See generally, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484(2019) (holding partisan
gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable). Still, the plaintiffs may bring partisan gerrymandering
claims if state constitutional language supports such action. See id. at 2507. Racial
gerrymandering claims are litigated under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution emanating from U.S. Supreme Court precedent commonly referred to as the

Shaw line of cases and their progeny. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993); see generally
Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and RepresentationRevisited: The New
Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, 59 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1559
(2018) (describing the Shaw line of cases and their progeny with emphasis on the intersection
of racial gerrymandering and Voting Rights Act (VRA) section 2 claims).
12. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 11, at 1571 (describing trends in VRA section

2 litigation).
13. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (establishing "one person one
vote" equipopulation requirement). Even today, equipopulation questions remain surprisingly

unsettled. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123, 1132-33 (2016) (holding that states
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constitutional or statutory provision.1 4 Far from a settled area of law,
redistricting lawsuits have proliferated since the 1960s when the Supreme
Court first entered the political thicket.' 5 The decade following the 2010
Census was no exception.16
In 2012, the Center for Public Integrity (CPI) released a report

measuring the level of transparency in each state's redistricting process
and assigning each state a grade of "A" through "F".1 7 The CPI assessed

this transparency grade based on a variety of inputs, including whether
the line drawing body held public meetings; whether those public
hearings actively solicited public input on proposed maps; whether
schedules of public meeting and/or hearings were available to the public;
whether the line drawing body accepted redistricting plans submitted by
the public; and whether the line drawing body made a redistricting
website or online resource of redistricting information publicly
available.18

may base legislative districting on total population figures for purposes of ensuring equal
numbers of people in district).
14. See, e.g., Vesilind v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 295 Va. 427, 432 (2018)
(unsuccessfully challenging several Virginia legislative districts on the grounds that they
violated the Virginia state constitution's compactness mandate).

15. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1962). Scholars commonly note the plentiful
nature of redistricting litigation. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 9, at 34; see also, e.g.,

Issacharoff, supra note 9, at 646. For an interesting take on litigation's problematic impact on
the redistricting process, see Manheim, supra note 9, at 571 (critiquing the lack of
transparency about redistricting litigants' motives).
16. See infra App. C. Various reporting has tried to quantify the cost of redistricting
litigation. E.g., Dave Ress, Redistricting Legal Battle Cost to Taxpayers: $4 Million and
Rising, DAILY PREss (Jul. 13, 2018), https://www.dailypress.com/government/local/dp-nws-

redistricting-bill-20180713-story.html. In 2018, Virginia House Speaker Kirk Cox released a
statement on the eve of Virginia maps' second visit to the U.S. Supreme Court that

redistricting litigation had cost Virginia taxpayers $4,067,098.03. Id. The Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel reported in 2019 that redistricting litigation had cost that state nearly $3.5 million
since the legislature drew its lines in 2011. Patrick Marley, RedistrictingLegal Fight on Track
to Cost Wisconsin Taxpayers $3.5 Million, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2019/01/22/wisconsin-gerrymandering-legalfight-track-cost-3-5-million/2645940002/.
17. See Caitlin Ginley, Gradingthe Nation: How Accountable Is Your State?, CTR. FOR

PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 19, 2012), https:/publicintegrity.org/state-politics/grading-the-nationhow-accountable-is-your-state/; see also, e.g., Maureen West, Arizona Gets D+ Grade in
2012 State Integrity Investigation, CTR FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 19, 2012),

https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/arizona-gets-d-grade-in-2012-state-integrityinvestigation/ (the CPI report card for Arizona's transparency integrity).
18. As explored infra, these factors do not elicit a perfect assessment of the level of
transparency a process offered. Some states received an "A" grade when subsequent litigation
revealed that transparency measures like open meetings and solicitation of public input were
in fact empty gestures serving as a front for backroom dealing. Florida's process, discussed
infra pp. 2027-30, provides evidence of this phenomenon. The CPI's approach is imperfect
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Using a state's CPI grade as a conversation starter, what role did
transparency play in fueling or quelling lawsuits challenging the lines?
Did states that received high CPI grades see less redistricting litigation?
Looking at court opinions issued over the decade, to what extent did the
level of transparency in a state's redistricting process affect courts'
assessment of the legality of the lines and/or the outcome of lawsuits
filed? Were courts more inclined to bless maps that emerged from a
transparent process? State CPI redistricting transparency grades and court

opinions provide vehicles to assess these questions. Resulting
ruminations may be useful to those considering whether and how to
incorporate transparency measures.
Part I starts with preliminaries, first assessing transparency as a

value in redistricting, its boundaries, its connection to process fairness,
and its dark side. It then establishes that state CPI transparency grades
were unreliable predictors of litigation volume in the past decade. While

some states with highly secretive processes did face onerous litigation,
others received excellent CPI grades and also experienced multiple and
lengthy court battles. Positing a few reasons why CPI scores seem to bear
little relation to litigation volume helps set the stage.
Parts II through V turn to examining the impact of redistricting

transparency on litigation from four different angles:

First, did

redistricting processes that were transparent in name only insulate states
from litigation? Looking at Florida's experience as an example, the

answer appears to be no-in that instance, faux-transparency fueled
litigation. Second, did meaningful redistricting reform with robust
transparency provisions reduce redistricting litigation? Apparently not. In

two states with significant reform in place for the first time in the 2010
round, litigation blossomed.1 9 Third, do courts care about transparency?
Most assuredly so. Court opinions throughout the decade routinely

discussed the degree of transparency state processes featured (or did
not). 20 When legal standards required courts to evaluate the intent of line
drawers, courts drew adverse inferences against shrouded redistricting
processes. 2 ' And fourth, is the Supreme Court's 2019 ruling that partisan
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable likely to significantly reduce

litigation volume in states with opaque processes that produce unfair
maps in the coming decade? The discussion below cautions otherwise.
but serves as a rough proxy to measure a baseline comparative level of process transparency.
See infra App. A.

19. See infra App. C.
20. E.g., Vandermost v. Bowen, 269 P.3d 446, 455 (Cal. 2012).
21. See, e.g., Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 809 (D. Md. 2017),
Ct. 1942 (2018).

aff'd, 138 S.
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I. PRELIMINARIES

Examining the relationship between process transparency and
redistricting litigation engages a complex set of dynamics. This section
discusses the contours of transparency in redistricting and the
inconclusive relationship between CPI grade and litigation states
experienced.
A. Transparencyin Redistricting
This paper uses states' CPI transparency grades as an organizing

tool, but it is worth stepping back to clarify the role of transparency in the
redistricting process, what exactly that term refers to, and what discussing
it in relation to litigation volume does and does not accomplish.
Redistricting transparency is complex, featuring many different
possible components. Most state statutes that affirmatively address
redistricting transparency (roughly half did in the 2010 round) do so by
mandating some combination of public meetings, publication of draft
maps, and advance public notice of both.22 These provisions are intended
to allow the public a chance to see "what their government is up to."2 3
But state redistricting transparency measures are often more than oneway information flows. Some redistricting transparency statutes and state
practice in the 2010 round also enabled public engagement in the process,
namely avenues for public comment and participation in line drawing.2 4
Public engagement has long been a core feature of reform efforts that
seek not only to give citizens a seat access to the line drawing process,
but also ways for members of the public to submit comments and their
own maps. 25

Two of the CPI's factors reflect this "two way street" view of
redistricting transparency. CPI's transparency metric included whether or
not the line drawing body actively solicited public input on proposed
maps and whether the line drawing body accepted maps from the public. 26

22. Green, supra note 5, at 1794.
23. Borrowing a phrase often used to describe the purpose of the federal government's
signature transparency law, the Freedom of Information Act: "The generation that made the
nation thought secrecy in government one of the instruments of Old World tyranny and
committed itself to the principle that a democracy cannot function unless the people are
permitted to know what their government is up to." U.S. Dep't of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for
Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772-73 (1989) (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)).
24. Green, supra note 5, at 1795 (providing examples of state redistricting statutes that
require avenues of public comment).
25. Id. at 1806 (describing transparency provisions and public participation measures built
into state redistricting commission processes).
26. See infra App. B.

2021]

Redistricting Transparency

1127

CPI's decision to include public engagement reflects what many good
government advocates understand: government transparency requires not

just making information available to the public, but also creating avenues
for the public to engage in government decision making. 27 Thus, in

important ways, what CPI measured was more than one-way
transparency-it attempted also to measure the degree to which the
process was responsive to and accommodating of public input. The
descriptor of "transparency" used here adopts this broader understanding.
It assumes that a robustly transparent redistricting process in the 2010

round featured access to line drawers' meetings, maps, and data and also
enabled members of the public to meaningfully engage in the process
through public comment and submitting maps of their own.28
A second clarification involves the relationship between
transparency and fairness. Part of the premise of this discussion is that

27. Soon after taking office, President Obama issued a memorandum to the heads of
federal government agencies. The memo emphasized the importance of making federal
documents and data publicly available (what we think of as transparency), but also stressed
the need for civic participation in government processes-the idea that transparency does not
go far enough on its own, that it should enable public participation in government decision

making. This impulse is likely to inform the CPI's inclusion of public participation in its
transparency metric. See Press Release, Barack Obama, President, White House,
Memorandum
on
Transparency
and
Open
Government
(Jan.
21,
2009),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/memorandumparticipatory. Public
be
should
("Government
transparency-and-open-government
engagement enhances the Government's effectiveness and improves the quality of its

decisions. Knowledge is widely dispersed in society, and public officials benefit from having
access to that dispersed knowledge. Executive departments and agencies should offer
Americans increased opportunities to participate in policymaking and to provide their
Government with the benefits of their collective expertise and information. Executive
departments and agencies should also solicit public input on how we can increase and improve
opportunities for public participation in Government.").
28. Not all scholars are keen on participatory democratic decision making, noting
important downsides. See e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political
Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 852 (2014)
("In the midst of the declining governing capacity of the American democratic order, we ought
to focus less on 'participation' as the magical solution and more on the real dynamics of how
to facilitate the organization of effective political power."); JONATHAN RAUCH, CTR. FOR
EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. BROOKINGS, POLITICAL, POLITICAL REALISM: How HACKS,
MACHINES, BIG MONEY, AND BACK-ROOM DEALS CAN STRENGTHEN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

21, 6 (2015) (praising the art of the backroom deal, lamenting the demise of the "political
machine") ("Practically every political reformer in the country-and for that matter
practically every schoolchild-will tell you that machines are rotten, that careers are slimy,
and that what politics needs is more popular participation, more attention to issues, more
transparency, more disinterest more fresh faces. The one-sided conversation has contributed
to one-sided policies and outcomes, in turn contributing to [a predictable result]: governing is

harder.").
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process transparency in redistricting makes the process more fair. 29 Yet,

anyone who has followed redistricting knows, a transparent process is not
necessarily a fair process. A legislative line drawing process may check
all the boxes indicating a transparent process took place: it may hold
public meetings, it may publish preliminary maps well in advance of
finalizing them, and it may accept public comments and alternative maps.
As a result, the CPI grade might be high. 30 But these features do not
necessarily mean the goals of transparency are served. The real horse
trading may still have taken place in the back room. Until recently,
members of the public lacked the access to data and tools to hold
legislators accountable. 3 1 Line drawers could make a show of
transparency without actually walking the walk. 32 As the discussion

29. Of the states that had independent redistricting commissions in the 2010 round, not all
sported high CPI grades: Alaska (F), Arizona (A), California (A), Colorado (C-), Idaho (A),
Montana (A), and Washington (A). See infra App. C. According to CPI researchers, Alaska's
redistricting transparency fell short because "regular citizens had a difficult time knowing the
details enough to meaningfully participate. Steve Aufrecht, a retired University of Alaska
Anchorage professor who closely tracked the redistricting process and published the results
on his blog and in the Anchorage Daily News noted that 'they had lots of meetings, but in
most cases, it was impossible for the public to know in advance the context-of what they were
doing or specifically what they were doing. Except for the groups that were putting alternate
proposals in. They had an incredible number of meetings all over the place, but with little

notice and almost no prior information. They were good for saying we had all these meetings,
but not for real exchange. A lot of the meetings were down time waiting for people to show
up."' 2012 CPI Data (on file with author). As for Colorado, according to Bob Loevy, a retired
political science professor and Republican appointed to Colorado's Commission by the Chief
Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, the commission amounted to no more than a

'marionette show' in which the outside mapping experts served as puppeteers." Lois Beckett,
Colorado Redistricting Had Inside Help, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 9, 2012, 9:00 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/kumbaya-to-confrontation-colorado-redistricting-started-

with-best-intention. Instead of Colorado commission staff drawing the maps, ProPublica
described the process this way: "Republicans and Democrats on the commission were
working off-hours with teams of outside consultants who were crafting competing partisan
maps. The consultants were not on the payroll of the commission-or even of the political

parties. Instead, at least some of their salaries were paid by nonprofit groups who had no legal
obligation to disclose who their funders were or how they spent their money." Id.
30. For a list of the factors feeding CPI's grade, see infra App. A. The CPI released its
redistricting transparency grades in 2012. A shortcoming of the CPI grades for present
purposes is that they do not capture the degree of transparency in redistricting that occurred

after the initial round-whether court ordered or politically motivated. See discussion infra at
Part IV (discussing, for example, Perez v. Abbott, 253 F. Supp. 3d 864, 961 (W.D. Tex. 2017)
involving the Texas legislature's decision to use revised lines once the U.S. Supreme Court
lifted preclearance requirements following Shelby County v. Holder.).
31. See infra App. A.
32. Florida's experience in the 2010 round is a good example of this. Florida's process
received a CPI transparency grade of A and yet litigation subsequently uncovered that partisan
shenanigans infected the process behind the scenes. See discussion infra Part II.
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below explores, sometimes litigants and courts could see through the
ruse; in an unknowable number of instances, they could not.
Finally, even when redistricting transparency is genuine and reflects
process fairness more generally, transparency has a dark side. 33 Public
comment mechanisms display this problem.3 4 As Bruce Cain
convincingly argues, "[t]he idea that disinterested citizens will come

forward in great numbers and channel [line drawers] in the direction of
some pure public interest is naive." 35 "Public input" is very often the

product of monied interests and organized interest groups that may distort
rather than reflect the true public will. 36 Transparency measures can
undoubtedly be manipulated (and are). 37 Related to these distortive
effects, transparency in the redistricting realm may benefit only the most
sophisticated among us unless the data and information transparency

mechanisms reveal is meaningfully contextualized and the public is
provided resources and tools to digest it. In redistricting, this can be a tall
order-the process involves complex laws, sophisticated data, and
mapping tools that although they are becoming far more user-friendly,
are still out of reach for too many would-be participants.38
Despite

these caveats,

process

transparency is an important

guidepost. As most reformers, line drawers, and courts recognize,
transparency-despite being an imperfect tool-provides the greatest

hope for fairness in the line drawing process members of the public have.
B. Litigation Volume
One reason we might expect a state with a transparent redistricting

process to experience less litigation is intuitive. Line drawers interested
33. See Green, supra note 5, at 1818-21 (discussing the downsides of transparency).
34. See generally Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?,
121 YALE L.J. 1808 (2012) (evaluating the efficacy of independent citizen commissions (ICC)
in redistricting).
35. Id. at 1841. Cain also points another caution: "Greater transparency and openness to
public input might have the ironic effect of heightening the expectations and disappointment
of those who do not get what they want from the reformed redistricting process." Id. at 1842.
36. See Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 9, 2009),
(arguing that government
https://newrepublic.com/article/70097/against-transparency
transparency has significant downsides); see also generally Edward H. Stiglitz & Aviv Caspi,
Observability and Reasoned Discourse: Evidence from the US. Senate (Cornell Legal

Studies, Research Paper, No. 20-42, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3627564 (describing
how transparency can distort reasoned discourse).
37 Some of these shortcomings are documented in Green, supra note 5, at 1817-21.

38. Id. at 1831-33 (discussing some of the ways technology can help the public engage
more meaningfully in the redistricting process). Note that public mapping interfaces are

becoming increasingly user-friendly. See also infra note 253 (discussing more recent
development of tools to assist members of the public in engaging the redistricting process).
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in self-dealing or otherwise manipulating lines to satisfy ulterior motives
might predictably attempt to obfuscate the process.3 9 That secretive
process is likely to yield maps that are unfair (otherwise, why duck and
cover?) Unfair maps would logically render opponents more likely to
litigate. 40 But the assumption that a more transparent process might lead
to less litigation has lots of holes, starting with the reality that
transparency may fuel litigation by exposing issues that otherwise would
not have seen the light of day! Maybe greater transparency lowers
barriers to disputing maps. The relationship between transparency and

litigation volume is far from straightforward. Examining the relationship
between CPI grade and litigation volume bears this out. 4 1
A few low-transparency-grade states did experience quite a lot of
litigation. Maryland (CPI grade of D-), North Carolina (F), Texas (F),
Virginia (C), and Wisconsin (F) all saw redistricting court battles

throughout the decade. 42 Redistricting litigation raged in those states in
large part because of highly partisan processes in which a majority party
dominated the process (and excluded the minority party almost
entirely). 43
39. See Green, supra note 5, at 1789 ("[T]he redistricting process ... took place in the
proverbial. .. smoke-filled room.").
40. Sometimes discovery enables litigants to pull back the veil and see what happened,
though for reasons discussed below, legislative privilege may thwart such attempts. See id. at
1800-04 (discussing legislative privilege and redistricting).
41. The present discussion does not attempt a qualitative accounting of redistricting
litigation volume in each state. Such an effort could be pursued from a number of different
angles. For example, litigation volumes might be assessed by the total number of months a
state spent defending its lines and/or the amount of money states spent defending their maps.
See supra note 16. (discussing news reports of the cost of defending maps in a few states).
Such efforts to quantify litigation volume would be thorny in a number of respects, not the
least of which is apples to oranges comparisons. For example, different redistricting authority

in different states complicates the comparison, as does including both federal and state claims
which offer litigants varying degrees of redress from state to state and which, during the 2010
round, still featured VRA §5 coverage of only some states and jurisdictions. Acknowledging
these difficulties, the present effort relies on a qualitative assessment each state's redistricting
litigation over the past decade. See infra App. C.
42. See infra App. C.
43. See, e.g., Jenna Portnoy, Hogan on High Court Ruling: 'GerrymanderingIs Wrong,
and Both Parties Are Guilty', WASH. POST (June 27, 2019, 1:39 PM),

https://www.washingtonpost.comlocal/md-politics/heres-what-the-supreme-court-rulingon-gerrymandering-means-for-mayland/2019/06/27/755f6dcc-92b9-11 e9-b5706416efdc0803_story.html; Billy Corriher, North CarolinaElections Show the Persistenceof

Partisan
Gerrymandering,
FACING
S.
(Nov.
18,
2020),
https://www.facingsouth.org/2020/1 1/north-carolina-election-results-show-persistencepartisan-gerrymandering; John C. Moritz, How Texas Became 'Ground-Zero' for
Gerrymandering Voter Suppression, CALLER TwMEs (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:00 AM),

https://www.caller.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/02/27/texas-republicansVirginia's
democrats-gerrymandering-legislative-districts-voter-suppression/4545917002/.
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In some states that received low CPI grades, litigation barely
surfaced, for example in Indiana, New Hampshire, North Dakota,

Oklahoma, and Utah. Each of these states received a grade of F and each
state endured very little if any litigation." One factor that may have
contributed is their size and relative homogeneity. As noted above, two
major triggers for redistricting litigation are racial gerrymandering and
VRA claims. 45 None of these five "F" states had minority populations
large enough to sustain a majority minority district in 2010, nor were

46
these states covered jurisdictions under section 5 of the VRA. These
47
factors likely contributed to lower litigation volumes in these states.

Then again, many states with large minority populations avoided
lengthy litigation. 48 Mississippi, with a minority population in 2010 of

forty-one percent, received the stellar CPI grade of A and experienced
relatively few redistricting lawsuits. 49 South Carolina, with a minority
population of thirty-four percent in 2010 and a CPI grade of B-, avoided
50
rampant litigation too (at least compared to its neighbor to the north).

process was an outlier within this group in this respect. While the Republican Party held a

majority in Virginia's General Assembly in the 2010 round, the maps were widely considered
bipartisan and incumbent-protective--a bipartisan gerrymander in which legislators of both
parties protected their seats. See Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, The Rigged
RedistrictingProcess, BROOKINGS (Mar. 18, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/therigged-redistricting-process/ (describing Virginia's process as "a classic bipartisan incumbent
gerrymander").
Dakota, South
Alaska, Wyoming, Montana, North
C.
App.
infra
44. See
Dakota, Vermont, and Delaware have only one U.S. congressional district. Generally, these
states did see less litigation. Id.
45. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARv. L. REv. 1903,

1929, 1933 (2012) (dissecting the impact of race and geography as it relates to redistricting
litigation).
46. Before Shelby County did away with the VRA coverage formula in 201. See Shelby

Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
47. Another possibility should be noted. Perhaps a greater volume of litigation might have
occurred in states with low CPI grades, but a lack of transparency stymied it. Shrouding
evidence from public view is a time-honored strategy for shielding legislative action from
oversight. Maybe in these states this strategy proved successful.
48. For purposes of VRA section 2 litigation, the size, compactness, and political cohesion
of minority voters determines whether or not a claim will be successful. See Thornburg v.

Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (setting out preconditions for successful VRA section 2
claims).
49. See

Population of Mississippi: Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map,

Demographics, Statistics, Quick Facts, CENSUS

VIEWER,

http://censusviewer.com/state/MS

(last visited May 10, 2021); see also infra App. C.
50. See Population of South Carolina: Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map,

Demographics, Statistics, Quick Facts, CENSUS VIEWER, http://censusviewer.com/state/SC
(last visited May 10, 2021); see also infra App. C.
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A key driver of redistricting litigation volume is, of course, politics.
Political culture, retributive impulses, reform agendas, and levels of
political (mis)trust all play a role in fueling litigation.
In the last round, controversial partisan powerplays colored much of
the decade's intrigue. One prime example is REDMAP. Republicans

targeted certain states for line drawing power grabs in an effort dubbed
the Redistricting Majority Project, or "REDMAP."5 1 At the top of the list

of target states were those with narrow Democratic majorities in state
legislatures: Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, North Carolina, and
Wisconsin. 52 Focusing on winning legislative races in those states prior

to line drawing gave Republicans control of the process. 53 After pouring
resources into winning legislative majorities in those states, Republicans

drew lines with the goal of maintaining those majorities.54 Elections held
after line drawing in these and other targeted states, as planned, often
featured Republicans with fewer votes statewide nevertheless capturing
a majority of U.S. congressional and/or state legislative seats."5 Many of

these states received poor CPI grades as partisans sought to cover their
tracks. 56
Of the five high-priority REDMAP states, three experienced heavy
redistricting litigation (Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Wisconsin)."

But two did not (relatively speaking): Ohio and Michigan. 58 Why? One
reason might be that Ohio and Michigan's initiative process gave

51. For a detailed description of these efforts, see DAVID DALEY, RATF**KED: THE TRUE
See

also Tim

Dickinson, How Republicans Rig the Game, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 11,
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics-news/how-republicans-rig-the-game-111011.

2013),

STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN TO STEAL AMERICA'S DEMOCRACY xxi

(2016).

Republicans were explicit about their designs. See, e.g., Karl Rove, The GOP Targets State
Legislatures: He Who Controls Redistricting Can Control Congress, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4,
2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703862704575099670689398044.
52. DALEY, supra note 51, at 3.

53. See id. at xxi.
54. See id. at 2.
55. Debates raged throughout the decade over whether gerrymandering was the cause of
such mismatched outcomes, some arguing the distortions had to do with geography, namely
wasted votes of Democrats in crowded urban centers. See, e.g., John Sides & Eric McGhee,
Redistricting Didn't Win Republicans the House, WASH.

POST (Feb.

17,

2013),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/02/17/redistricting-didnt-winrepublicans-the-house/.
56. In the five states REDMAP targeted, all featured CPI grades of F (North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan and Wisconsin). See infra App. C. Ohio and Michigan are two
states on REDMAP's target list that, comparatively speaking, did not see a high volume of
litigation. Id.
57. See infra App. C (Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Wisconsin).
58. See infra App. C (Ohio and Michigan).
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59
reformers a better avenue to push for change than filing lawsuits.

Perhaps the lever of direct democracy available in these two states but
not the other three contributed to some degree to dissuading would-be
plaintiffs who instead put resources towards more direct ways to fix the
process. Plaintiffs in the other target REDMAP states-North Carolina,

Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin-lacked direct democracy tools. Litigation
over the lines in those states was the only avenue.

What to make of these preliminaries? Transparency in redistricting

can be superficial, gamed and/or irrelevant to whether litigation unfolds.
It is clear that drivers of redistricting litigation are complex. The
following discussion stakes the claim that although not a reliable
predictor of litigation volume, the degree of transparency in state

redistricting processes mattered in ways that are instructive.
II. CAN FEIGNED TRANSPARENCY FUEL LITIGATION? (YES)
Line drawers

engaging in faux-transparency

risked bringing

protracted litigation upon themselves in the 2010 round. One good
example is Florida. Florida received a CPI grade of A, but the process
nevertheless produced classically unfair maps.60 When litigation rained
down, discovery revealed that Florida's A grade concealed massive
transparency deficiencies when it came to how line-drawing decisions
were actually made.
The 2010 round represented the first time Florida redistricted under
a new constitutional provision intended to stem partisan gerrymandering
in the state. On November 2, 2010, sixty-three percent of Florida voters
supported an amendment to the Florida state constitution prohibiting

59. Reform in both states produced significant changes to the line drawing process (after
much litigation, especially in Michigan, over such reform efforts). See Michael Li & Kelly
Percival, The Attack on Michigan's Independent Redistricting Commission, BRENNAN CTR.
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/attack2020),
13,
(Feb.

michigans-independent-redistricting-commission (describing Michigan reformers fight to
establish a commission and the litigation it produced). For an overview of the reform effort
in Ohio, see FAIR DISTRICTS OIo, http://www.fairdistrictsohio.org (last visited May 10,
2021), and Grayson Keith Sieg, Note, A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting Reform Through
Referendum, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 901, 942-43 (2015) (describing redistricting reform in
Ohio). For details on Michigan reformers efforts, see VOTERS NOT POLITICIANS,
https://votersnotpoliticians.com (last visited May 10, 2021) and Li & Percival, supra note 59.
60. See infra App. B; see also Mary Ellen Klas, Florida Supreme Court Orders New
CongressionalMap with Eight Districts to Be Redrawn, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jul. 9, 2015),
https://www.tampabay. com/news/politics/stateroundup/florida-supreme-court-orders-new-

congressional-map-with-eight-districts-to/2236734/.
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partisanship in legislative line drawing.61 Many state redistricting reform

efforts focused on wresting redistricting power from the legislature
completely. 62 Floridians chose to leave the legislature in charge but
required that it refrain from politicizing the process. 63 A tall order as it

turned out.
When the state legislature adopted new maps on February 9, 2012,

critics quickly sued, arguing that the maps defied the constitutional
amendment's prohibition of politics in the process. 4 The Florida
Supreme Court upheld the house districts but agreed with the challengers
that the senate districts violated the amendment. 65 The legislature
subsequently submitted a revised senate map for court review on March
27, 2012.66 The Florida Supreme Court approved the revisions, and the

Department of Justice precleared the maps on April 30, 2012, the same
year CPI bestowed its A grade on the process. 67

But this early jostling did not end the story, in large part because of
the lopsided impacts the maps produced. After a round of elections under
the new maps, outcomes featured a classic lopsided tilt. Even though
Democrats outnumbered Republicans in Florida (forty-one percent vs.
thirty-six percent respectively), Democrats won just ten of Florida's

twenty-seven congressional seats in the first election under the new
maps. 68 The state senate featured a 12-28 split, and Republicans in the

61. See FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20-21 ("No apportionment plan or individual district shall
be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent"); see also
LINDA HONOLD & ADRIEN SCHLESS-MEIER, BRENNAN CTR., CASE STUDIES OF STATE
REDISTRICTING CAMPAIGNS, VOLUME 3: FLORIDA: FAIRDISTRICTSFLORIDA.ORG 3 (2015).

62. See Green, supra note 5, at 1805. For instance, California voted to vest redistricting
power in the independent California Citizens Redistricting Commission (CCRC) in 2010. See
Carol Goodhue Shull & Robert Shull, California Gets B-Grade in 2012 State Integrity
Investigation, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY

(last updated

Nov.

2, 2015, 5:06 PM),

https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/california-gets-b-grade-in-2012-stateintegrity-investigation/.

63. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20 (voters passed Amendment 6 to the Florida Constitution
in 2010, established additional criteria to the redistricting process including a prohibition on
favoring or disfavoring any political party).
64. Florida,
ALL
ABOUT
REDISTRICTING,
LOYOLA
L.
SCH.,
https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/florida (last visited May 10, 2021).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Florida at the time was still a covered state under VRA section 5, and thus subject
to preclearance of its maps. See About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, DEP'T OF JUST.,

https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rightsact#:-:text=Section%205%20was%20designed%20to,applicable%20only%20to%20certain
%20states (last visited May 10, 2021).
68. HONOLD & SCHLESS-MEIER, supra note 61, at 13.
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house outnumbered Democrats by more than 2 to 1.69 Plaintiffs were left
with the distinct impression that something fishy had gone on in the
Sunshine State's redistricting process.

Despite the transparency measures in place that earned Florida the
highest mark from CPI, subsequent litigation revealed that Florida's

grade was unearned. The charge that political factors had infiltrated the
process to benefit Republican legislators again landed Florida's map in

court. 70 Trial court judge Terry Lewis had the unenviable job of parsing
the extent to which politicians behaved politically in drawing the maps in
contravention of Florida's new state constitutional mandate.7 1
In the end, after lengthy discovery battles, 72 Judge Lewis looked
beyond lip-service transparency and found a process riddled with behindthe-scenes political intrigue. 73 Two processes had in fact taken place: an
open and transparent process that ticked the boxes for CPI's A grade, and
a second shadow process in which political operatives worked to pass
partisan maps, making what Judge Lewis described as a "mockery of the
Legislature's proclaimed transparent and open process of redistricting,"
and "going to great lengths to conceal from the public their plan and their

participation in it." 74 Judge Lewis's opinion called out the political
intrigue that had manipulated transparency measures built into the
process:
In this secretive process,

...

political consultants would make

suggestions and submit their own partisan maps to the Legislature
through that public process, but conceal their actions by using proxies,

third persons who would be viewed as "concerned citizens," to speak at
public forums from scripts written by the consultants and to submit
proposed maps in their names to the Legislature, which were drawn by
the consultants.7 5
Judge Lewis ultimately struck Florida's maps as violating the state
constitutional prohibition of favoring a political party in the line drawing

process. 76 The Florida Supreme Court later agreed. 77

69. Id.
70. See Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA-00412, 2014 WL 3797315, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
July 10, 2014).
71. See id. ("There are some real problems in trying to make such a determination of
legislative intent in this case.").
72. See discussion infra note 173-79.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Romo, 2014 WL 3797315, at *11.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *3
League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 416 (Fla. 2015).
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Litigation rained down on Florida's maps from all sides. In addition
to the state constitutional claim and suits brought to access information
about the process, 78 plaintiffs brought claims under the VRA,7 9 they
levied racial gerrymandering suits, 80 and they challenged the maps on
equipopulation grounds. 8 1 The "story behind the story" of Florida's "A"

CPI grade demonstrates that faked transparency does not insulate line
drawers from suit. Faked transparency can fan the flames.
III. DOES REDISTRICTING REFORM INSULATE STATES FROM LITIGATION?

(NOPE)
Like Florida, Arizona also implemented citizen-led redistricting
reform in the last round. 82 Successful reform of the redistricting process
in Arizona took power away from the state legislature to draw the lines
via a citizen commission with laudable transparency features. Those
transparency measures, however, failed to stem litigation in the ensuing
decade for reasons worth exploring.
In 2011, Arizona voters, through a ballot initiative, installed a
commission to redistrict the state. 83 The Republican-led legislature
immediately challenged the existence of the commission, specifically
whether the people through the initiative process possess authority to
remove the statute legislature's constitutionally-delegated power to draw

the lines. 84 After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that the
people could strip the legislature of the power to redistrict, Arizona's
commission got to work. 85
One of the signature features of the commission was its robust
transparency. 86 Before drawing a single line, commissioners embarked
78. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (N.D.
Fla. 2012).
79. See Brown v. Detzner, No. 4:15-cv-00398-MW/CAS, at 3-4 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
80. See Warinner v. Detzner, No. 6:13-cv-01860-ORL-JA-DAB, at 3, 6-7 (M.D. Fla.
2014); see also Warinner v. Detzner, No. 4:14-cv-00164-JA, at 1 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
81. Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm'r, No. 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS, at 2 (N.D.
Fla. 2015).
&

82. See generally COLLEEN MATHIS ET AL., ASH CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION, THE ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION: ONE STATE'S MODEL

FOR GERRYMANDERING REFORM (2019) (describing Arizona's redistricting reforms).

83. See
Proposition 106 §
3
(Ariz. 2000),
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/pubpamphlet/sun sounds/english/prop106.htm.
84. Ariz. Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787, 814 (2015).
85. See id. at 792-93.
86. The Arizona redistricting commission's transparency requirements are enshrined in
its constitution, Ariz. Const. Article I, Part 2, Section 1(16) ("The independent redistricting
commission shall advertise a draft map of congressional districts and a draft map of legislative
districts to the public for comment, which comment shall be taken for at least thirty days.").
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on a "listening tour," holding twenty-three public meetings around the
state.8 7 Once line drawing began, the commission sought public comment

at each of its livestreamed meetings, allowing members of the public to
fill out a "request to speak" form and supply their input for the record.88

The commission also made available an online portal for public
comment. 89 Once the commission produced and published its draft maps,
commissioners again traveled the state, visiting thirty municipalities to
gather feedback on the draft lines. 90 The public ultimately supplied more
than 7,400 items of input and 224 maps.91 It was not an empty exercise;

the commission absorbed public feedback. According to the commission
chair, "Commissioners considered this feedback and incorporated much
of it into the final maps." 92 Finally, the Arizona commission staffed a

public information officer and a video/IT expert who worked to enable
the public to participate. 93
Despite these robust transparency measures, litigation nevertheless

challenged both the process and the final maps Arizona's commission
produced.

Transparency

proved

an early battleground.

Arizona's

Attorney General sought a court order forcing the independent
commissioners to cooperate with an investigation into whether or not the

commission had abided Arizona's open meeting laws. 94 Not to be
outdone, this spurred Arizona Democrats to file an open records request
95
seeking records related to the Attorney General's investigation. As

these scuffles played out, Arizona's Governor Jan Brewer called for the
See also MATHIS ET AL., supra note 82, at 4 (describing the Arizona commission's
transparency protections, "the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) went
to great lengths to ensure the public had numerous opportunities and methods to engage
throughout the entire process.").
87. Carson Hanson, The Value of Democracy: Independent RedistrictingCommissions as

a Solution for Partisan Gerrymandering, MEDIUM
(Aug.
30,
2020),
https://chanson7908.medium.com/the-value-of-democracy-6dad87b65dc.
88. See id.; MATHIS ET AL., supra note 82, at 5.
89. MATHIS ET AL., supra note 82, at 5.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Videos and transcripts of these meetings and hearings remain archived and
accessible on the commission website at http://azredistricting.org. MATHIS ET AL., supra note
82, at 5.
94. See Jim Nintzel, Court Ruling: Redistricting Commission Is Not Subject to Open
Meeting
Law,
TucSON
WKLY.
(Dec.
9,
2011,
5:24
PM),
https://www.tucsonweekly.com/TheRange/archives/2011/12/09/court-ruling-irc-is-notsubject-to-open-meeting-law.
95. See Frederic I. Solop & Ajang Salkhi, Redistricting in Arizona: An Independent
Process Challenged by PartisanPolitics in THE POLICAL BATTLE OVER CONGRESSIONAL
REDISTRICTING 215-16, 220 (William J. Miller, et al., eds. 2013).
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impeachment of the commission chair, Colleen Mathis. 96 The Senate
subsequently did impeach Mathis by a two-thirds vote on November 1,
2011,97 which Mathis successfully undid via an Arizona Supreme Court
ruling a few weeks later on November 17, 2011.98 These tussles presaged
what ensued when the commission eventually did produce maps: lots
more litigation. 99

In the end, Arizona's open process was no match for the political
maelstrom that swirled. Arizona's experience serves as a cautionary tale

for other states engaged in redistricting reform: regardless of how fairly
a process is designed, it may be impossible to stem the tide of litigation
if politics are divided and a powerful enough bloc aims to stymie reform
and its fruits-particularly when reform involves wresting power from
that political faction. This phenomenon is playing out in states like
Michigan where anti-reform groups have litigated every step of the way
to try (unsuccessfully) to preserve the legislature's

grip on line

drawing. 100
Do the experiences of Arizona and Florida suggest that redistricting
reform inevitably breeds litigation? The answer is not necessarily. In the
2010 round, California's newly-installed redistricting commission drew
maps that did not provoke endless litigation, a feat given the fierce court
battles California saw in previous decades.10' As it turns out, transparency

96. See Marc Lacey, Arizona Senate, at Governor's Urging, Ousts Chief of Redistricting
Panel, N.Y. TiMEs (Nov. 2, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/us/arizona-

republicans-oust-colleen-mathis-head-of-redistricting-panel.html.
97. Alex Isenstadt, Arizona Redistricting Chief Impeached, POLrTICO (Nov. 1, 2011),
https://www.politico.com/story/2011/1 1/arizona-redistricting-chief-impeached-067408.
98. See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Brewer, 275 P.3d 1267, 1268, 1278 (Ariz.
2012) (ordering that Mathis be reinstated as chair of the redistricting commission).
99. See
Arizona,
ALL
ABOUT
REDISTRICTING,
LOYOLA
L.
https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/arizona/?cycle=2020&level=Congress&startdate=

SCH.,
(last

visited May 10, 2021).
100. For an overview of the litigation that has swirled in Michigan concerning voters'

efforts to install an independent redistricting commission, see Michael Li et al., The State of
Redistricting Litigation: A Roundup of Where Key Redistricting Cases Across the Country
Stand,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUST.
N.Y.U.
L.
(Feb.
10,
2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/state-redistricting-litigation.
101. See Angelo N. Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens
RedistrictingCommission, 8 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 109, 112 (2014) ("[T]he state's history

of redistricting during the previous four decades has been complex, and it reflects both
legislative and judicial participation in the line-drawing process, as well as the influence of
direct democracy checks by the state's voters. This history is central to understanding the
recent reforms in California because they reflect an interplay of the legislature, the courts, the
major parties, and the voters that ultimately led to the Commission structure adopted in
2008."); see also infra App. B.
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was part of the secret sauce that tamped down litigation in the Golden
10 2
State. The CPI awarded California's process a well-deserved A.
In 2008, California voters passed Proposition 11 which created a

103 The
fourteen-person, independent citizens' redistricting commission.
commission featured broad transparency measures, including public
104 While
scrutiny and input to a degree the state had never seen before.
many believed the approach to be a vast improvement over legislativelydrawn lines, plaintiffs nevertheless challenged the formation of the
commission and the lines it drew, all unsuccessfully.1 05
Litigation over California lines revealed that transparency mattered
very much to the courts hearing the cases. One of the best examples of

judicial deference to the California commission's maps stemming from
106
The case
its high degree of transparency is Vandermost v. Bowen.

involved whether the commission's state senate maps should be used in
a spring primary election in advance of a November general election vote
107
on a popular referendum that would invalidate the commission's work.
In weighing this question, the California Supreme Court underscored
process transparency as a key factor in ruling that the commission's state

08
senate map be used on an interim basis pending the referendum vote.1

102. See infra App. B.
103. See Shull & Shull, supra note 62. Voters later passed Proposition 20, extending the

commission's responsibilities from state legislative districts to include U.S. congressional
districts as well. Id.; CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY,
NOVEMBER 2, 2010: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 96 (2010). Proposition 20 also
revised the deadline to produce the final maps (advancing it by one month), and clarified
redistricting criteria related to communities of interest. See id.
104. See Cain, supra note 34, at 1826-27 (describing the transparency features of

California's redistricting commission (CRC): "The extent of the CRC's public outreach was
staggering: thirty-four public meetings in thirty-two locations around the state, more than
2700 participants, and over 20,000 written comments. Moreover, the hearings were carried
live by Internet and hearing transcripts made available on the commission's webpage. The
Irvine Foundation established outreach centers around the state that made software and some
computer assistance available to those who wanted to draw their own maps. Bound by the
state's open meeting laws to make decisions in public (including many legal and personnel

discussions that often are held in executive session), there was little that the CRC could say
or do that was not open for public inspection. The first and all subsequent versions of the

CRC's plans were posted on its web page.").
105. See Ancheta, supranote 101, at 110 ("Not unexpectedly, there were multiple lawsuits
contesting the maps, and opponents qualified a referendum to require voter approval of the

Commission's map for the state Senate. None of the challenges was successful.").
106. See 269 P.3d 446, 484 (2012).
107. Id. at 450-51.
108. Id. at 452 ("The membership of the Commission selected to create new districts in

light of the 2010 census was finalized in late 2010, and in the first eight months of 2011 the
Commission held more than 70 business meetings and 34 public hearings in 32 cities
throughout the state. The Commission produced draft statewide maps on which it sought and
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In its opinion the court exhaustively detailed the commission's
transparency measures.10 9 Ultimately, the court concluded that the high
degree of process transparency supplied a key reason for using the
commission's map:
[U]nlike the proffered alternatives, not only do the Commissioncertified Senate districts appear to comply with all of the
constitutionally mandated criteria set forth in California Constitution,
... the Commission-certified Senate districts also area productofwhat
generally appears to have been an open, transparentand nonpartisan

redistrictingprocess .... We believe these features may properly be
viewed as an element favoring use of the Commission-certified map.11 0

No doubt California's redistricting reform operated in a less
politically divisive atmosphere than Arizona or Florida; California has a
firmly-established Democrat majority.' Still, when challenges did arise,
the California commission's transparent process helped its maps survive.
Reform can be painful. States with new reforms in place should gird
for litigation if the political headwinds against reform have enough force
and partisan opponents in the state have enough to gain. Arizona and

Florida's experience in the last round should not provide an argument
against reform, but rather should serve as a dose of realism that even
transparent processes (particularly those that are only superficially so)
can still draw litigation. 112 Regardless, California's efforts to create an

responded to public comment, and finally, in mid-August 2011, it approved and certified all
four required maps.").

109. Id. at 456-57 ("The constitutional provision requires the Commission to 'conduct an
open and transparent process enabling full public consideration of and comment on the

drawing of district lines.' Section 8253 implements that charge, and requires the Commission
to 'establish and implement an open hearing process for public input and deliberation that

shall be subject to public notice and promoted through a thorough outreach program to solicit
broad public participation in the redistricting public review process. The hearing process shall
include hearings to receive public input before the commission draws any maps and hearings
following the drawing and display of any commission maps. In addition, hearings shall be
supplemented with other activities as appropriate to further increase opportunities for the
public to observe and participate in the review process. The commission shall display the
maps for public comment in a manner designed to achieve the widest public access reasonably
possible. Public comment shall be taken for at least 14 days from the date of public display
of any map."').
110. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
111. See
15
Day
Report
of Registration,
CAL.
SEC'Y
OF
STATE,
https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ror/ror-pages/15day-gen-10/hist-reg-stats.pdf
(last visited
May 10, 2021). In 2010, Democrats comprised forty-four percent of the California electorate,
Republicans thirty-one percent, and Independents twenty percent. Id.

112. But note that scholars have pointed to less partisan processes leading to less litigation.
See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 9, at 644 ("Although the track record of ... nonpartisan
alternatives is uneven, the general trend so far is that plans drawn outside the partisan arena
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open and fair process demonstrate that transparency can help line drawers
win the favor of courts.
IV. DO COURTS CARE ABOUT TRANSPARENCY? (YUP)

As in California, courts in other states routinely cited a lack of
transparency or an abundance of it to support their rulings.' Gauging
process fairness regardless of outcome is familiar territory for courts. In
the criminal realm, for example, a defendant's guilt or innocence is not a

basis to overturn a conviction." 4 The fairness of the process that led to
that conviction is the key consideration." 5 In redistricting litigation over
the past decade's lines, courts routinely cited the fairness of the process
that produced those maps either in support of their findings or to voice
displeasure. Sometimes the level of transparency proved dispositive to
the outcome.' 16 Additionally, when legal standards required courts to
weigh the intent of line drawers, a lack of transparency prompted courts
to draw adverse inferences against line drawers who shrouded the
process."1 7 The discussion below parses when and why courts invoked
transparency in their reasoning.
A. Courts Routinely Include Descriptionsof Process Transparency (or
Lack Thereof) in Their Opinions
The California Supreme Court in Vandermost v. Bowen was not an

anomaly. Courts regularly included descriptions of the degree of
transparency in the process when articulating their findings. 118 A first
feature to note is the instrumental nature of courts' use of transparency.
Sometimes courts-particularly lower courts-painted a picture of
transparency that supported the desired outcome, in some cases giving

line-drawers more credit for transparency than they deserved.119

produce less litigation, less contortion, and less opportunity for insider manipulation than do
partisan processes.").
113. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 416 (Fla. 2015).

114. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
115. See, e.g., id. ("Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have
never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional
violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.").
116. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla., 172 So. 3d at 416; Vandermost v. Bowen,

269 P.3d 446, 484 (Cal. 2012).
117. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla., 172 So. 3d at 392-93, 416.

118. See, e.g., id. at 437-38.
119. See, e.g., Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS
200, at *9-10 (Sup. Ct. Wake Cnty. Oct. 28, 2019).
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Appellate courts did not always abide this rosy view, as in Alabama and
Maryland. 1 2 0
Alabama received a CPI grade of F and experienced intense
litigation over its lines. 12 1 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
Alabama's lines as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama.'22 While the U.S. Supreme Court

opinion did not delve into process transparency in its opinion, the district
court discussed transparency measures in Alabama's process to support

its rejection of the plaintiffs' racial gerrymandering challenge.123 At one
point in its opinion, for example, the district court stressed that, "[a]t the
beginning of the reapportionment process, the Committee conducted
public hearings at 21 locations throughout Alabama."12 4 The court

continued with a detailed discussion of where public meetings took place,
which line drawers attended, and summarized the content of public
input. 2 1 Presumably the district court detailed opportunities for public
input in the mapmaking process as evidence that the final maps were the
product of a legitimate process. This even despite the state receiving an
F for its transparency efforts and in advance of a Supreme Court slapdown of maps the district court approved.1 2 6
120. See Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 279 (2015); see also In re
2012 Legis. Districting, 80 A.3d 1073, 1086 (Ct. App. Md. 2013).
121. See App. C.

122. See 575 U.S. at 279.
123. Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1246 (M.D. Ala.
2013),judgment entered, No. 2:12-CV-1081, 2013 WL 6913115 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 20, 2013),
vacated andremanded, 575 U.S. 254 (2015).
124. Id.
125. Id. In addition to describing public meetings, the district court also noted the extent to
which a consultant the Republican committee hired to make the maps took pains to
incorporate comments from Democrats in the legislature (though the court acknowledged

such outreach was limited). See id. at 1248. "Although during this phase Hinaman did not
personally speak with the black members of the Legislature who represented those districts,
he incorporated proposals that he received from Senator Dial and Representative McClendon
after they met with the representatives from those districts." Id. "Hinaman continued to work

on the district plans and incorporate feedback from the legislators. Hinaman traveled to
Alabama to meet in person with many of the Republican legislators. Although he did not meet
with Democratic legislators, he incorporated suggestions that Senator Dial and Representative
McClendon received from Democratic legislators." Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 989 F. Supp.
2d at 1248.
126. Data supporting Alabama's report cites negative views of the degree of transparency
afforded during the process, for example including this description:
The journalists and [a state senator who had described the process as transparent] saw
the redistricting process very differently. They saw the process as occurring with little
input from the public, with announcements of meetings not occurring far enough in
advance for the public to respond, and the meetings just going through the motions to
obtain federal clearance. This separation of the legislative process from public
participation was borne out in interviews with [members of the press]. Essentially
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Three different courts described the degree of transparency in
Maryland's Democratic-led process very differently, demonstrating that
courts may use perceptions of transparency instrumentally to suit an

outcome preference. 1 27 In reality, the D-grade CPI awarded Maryland for
transparency in its process undercuts the idealistic-sounding descriptions

of two of the courts below.1 28
In Gorrellv. O'Malley, the district court judge describes a seemingly
transparent and open process when granting the state's motion to dismiss:
From July 23, 2011 to September 12, 2011, the [legislative redistricting
committee] held 12 public hearings, receiving public comment as it
drafted a redistricting plan for the Governor to present to the Maryland
legislature.. . . The [committee] invited citizens to propose redistricting

plans by September 19, 2011. ... On October 9, 2011, a Maryland
senator showed a group of citizens, including [plaintiff], a map of the
[committee]-recommended boundaries with the population of each
proposed district.1 29

In addition, the court detailed instances in which the plaintiff,
Howard Lee Gorrell, had taken part in the public process himself. 130 The
judge included a description of a transparent process and the plaintiff's
ability to participate in it as support his finding for the state. 131
Likewise, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld Maryland's
legislative districts against claims that they violated Maryland's
constitution, the U.S. Constitution, and the VRA.1 32 Despite Maryland's

what the journalists . . . said is that while public meetings were held, they were late
being announced, poorly publicized, had very low attendance, received little or no
comment from the floor (usually about some personal concern, not redistricting), and
the redistricting maps were available too late in the process to permit genuine citizen
input. Moreover, ... cloture was invoked in the Senate, killing further discussion on

two competing proposals. [Observers said they] had no idea which proposal was to go
forward until it was introduced on the Senate floor.
See 2012 CPI data (on file with author).

127. See Gorrell v. O'Malley, No. WDQ-11-2975, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6178, at *2-3
(D. Md. Jan. 19, 2012); In re 2012 Legis. Districting, 80 A.3d 1073, 1076 (Ct. App. Md.
2013); Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 809-10 (D. Md. 2017), affd, 138 S. Ct. 1942
(2018).
128. See Gorrell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6178, at *2-3; In re 2012 Legis. Districting,80
A.3d at 1073.
129. Gorrell, 2012 U.S. Dist. 6178, at *2-3.
130. Id. ("Gorrell, who is deaf, attended and testified at the hearings. The [redistricting
committee] invited citizens to propose redistricting plans by September 19, 2011, a deadline
established in its 'Guidelines for Third Party Plan Proposals' . . . On September 19, 2011,
Gorrell submitted a proposal, which the [the redistricting committee] posted on the Maryland
Department of Planning website for public consideration.").

131. See id.
132. In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 80 A.3d at 1118.
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D-CPI grade, 133 at several points in the opinion the court highlighted the
transparency features of Maryland's redistricting process:
In March 2011, following the receipt of the 2010 census data for

Maryland, the Governor convened a five member committee, the
Governor's Redistricting Advisory Committee ("GRAC"), to draft and
recommend, after holding public hearings and accepting public

comment, a plan for the redistricting of the State's Congressional and
Legislative Districts. The GRAC held 12 public hearings during the
summer of 2011 and, on December 16, 2011, published its plan for the
apportionment of the State's 47 Legislative Districts.1 34

The court also quoted Maryland Democratic legislators on the
degree of transparency throughout its opinion.' 35 In one instance, for
example, the court quoted the chair of Maryland's 2011 redistricting
committee in her insistence that, "[t]hroughout this process, the
[committee] made an extraordinary effort to take into account the many
concerns and comments from experts and citizens from across
Maryland."'1

36

The court went out of its way to characterize the process

as transparent and fair in upholding the maps.
But descriptions of the degree of transparency in Maryland's process
received very different treatment in Benisek v. Lamone.1 37 The majority
of the three-judge panel at the U.S. District Court for the District of

Maryland denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to
strike Maryland's map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.'

38

Nevertheless, in its findings of fact, the majority called out legislators'
lack of process transparency: "Maryland's 2011 redistricting process

involved two parallel procedures: a public-facing procedure led by the
Governor's Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure
involving Maryland's congressional delegation and a consulting firm
called NCEC Services, Inc."'39

133. CPI investigators discounted whether transparency measures were genuine, "While

meetings [were] held in the redistricting process, only one held by a General Assembly joint
committee addressed the final map itself and while opposition was expressed by minority
interests, Republicans and NGO's, no change[s] were made to the plan produced by the
Democratic governor's commission on the matter [i]n the heavily Democratic state." 2012
CPI Data (on file with author).
134. In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 80 A.3d at 1076.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 175 n.33.
137. See 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 809 (D. Md. 2017), aff'd, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018).
138. See id. at 839.
139. Id. at 809.
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The dissenting judge who would have struck the map as an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, picked up on this theme.1 40 He
upbraided the Maryland legislature for creating a veneer of transparency:
While the Advisory Committee was holding public hearings across the

State, the Democratic members of Maryland's U.S. House
Delegation-led by Representative Hoyer, a self-described "serial
gerrymanderer,"-had already begun to redraw the State's
congressional map. Indeed, around the time that the results of the 2010
census became available in late February/early March 2011-months

before the Advisory Committee was even created-Hoyer and the other
Maryland Democrats in the House retained NCEC Services, Inc., a

political consulting firm that provides "electoral analysis, campaign
strategy, political targeting, and GIS [feographic information system]
services" to Democratic organizations. 4

While the shadow process described did not ultimately persuade two
out of the three judges to rule in the plaintiffs' favor, all three judges made
a clear point of calling out the lack of transparency in Maryland's
process. 142

A second observation is that, in some cases, courts appeared to
believe their hands were tied by required legal standards, yet nevertheless
reprimanded states for failing to adequately incorporate transparency
measures. GeorgiaState Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia is a good

example. 143 That case involved a mid-decade redistricting the state
enacted following Shelby County v. Holder'sremoval of the requirement
that Georgia seek federal preclearance for changes to its maps. 144 As the
court describes, the Republican-dominated legislature undertook the reredistrict in an overt effort to save two Republican legislators from
changing demographics in their districts. 14 5 Clearly irritated to be
hamstrung by the racial gerrymandering standard requiring proof that
racial considerations predominated the line drawing process, the court

upheld the maps. 14 6 But that did not stop the court from detailing the

140. See id. at 823 (Niemeyer J., dissenting)
141. Id. at 823 (Niemeyer J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
142. See Benisek, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 809. Litigation over Maryland's maps continued
through the Rucho decision which put an end to federal partisan gerrymandering claims. See

Rucho
143.
2018).
144.
145.
146.

v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506-07 (2019).
See Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Georgia, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1363 (N.D. Ga.
See id at 1359 (citing Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013)).
See id. at 1359, 1363.
See id. at 1359.
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mischiefs lawmakers undertook to make the two districts whiter.1 47 The
court stressed that, "African-American legislators were excluded from
the process of drawing and negotiating the redistricting in [the state's
maps], and minority residents of Georgia were denied any opportunity

for public comment on the measure." 148 The court further underscored
that while legislators were consulted, the public was not.1 49 Though the
court ultimately upheld the maps, it explicitly chided line drawers for the
lack of transparency.' 50
Litigation in Pennsylvania (which received a CPI grade of F)

likewise highlights courts' concern for transparency.15 1 Pennsylvania
citizens tried multiple attacks on the 2011 legislative maps before finally
scoring a partisan gerrymandering win based on a provision in the
Pennsylvania constitution.1 5 2 In an earlier compactness and contiguity

challenge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found itself wrestling with a
lack of evidentiary record on the question of whether line drawers split
political subdivisions for purely partisan gain. 153 Wrote the court,
The difficulty ... resides in attempting to identify with any level of
precision where and how, if at all, . . . political factors cross the line,
and can be said to have caused subdivision splits that were not
absolutely necessary. There is no relevant record of the reasons why
particular splits were made, pointing in either direction.154

The court then lamented that the Pennsylvania constitution does not
require more transparency to enable citizens to unpack what happened:

147. See id. at 1363 ("No one disputes the new maps gave Districts 105 and 111 more white
voters and fewer black voters.").
148. Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1271 (2017).
149. Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Georgia, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2018)
("While Representative Nix made much of the fact that no changes were made to districts

unless all affected legislators agreed, nothing in this record suggests the affected communities
had any input. Neither does the legislative process suggest transparency or public
engagement.").

150. See id. at 1369. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion begrudgingly because of the
standard foisted upon it for racial gerrymandering (i.e., that racial considerations must
predominate in line drawing decisions). See id. at 1368-69. Because the state was able to
point to race neutral reasons for each line drawing decision, and because the shapes of the
districts were not "extreme and bizarre," the court held for the state but not without revealing

deep concern and skepticism about the process. Id. at 1366 (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 971 (1996)).
151. See infra App. C.
152. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 741 (Pa. 2018) (citing
PA. CONST. art. I, § 5).
153. See Holt v. 2011 Legis. Reapportionment Comm'n, 67 A.3d 1211, 1239 (Pa. 2013).
154. Id.
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We are not unsympathetic to the plight of citizen challengers who have

no way of going behind the plans that were produced, or assessing
generalized responsive justifications. And, there is nothing inherent in
the redistricting process to preclude the [committee] from being more
transparent in its intentions. But, on the other hand, the commission
process is the process the Constitution has provided, the Constitution

does not require that level of explication.' 55
Plaintiffs at this stage of litigation were unable to surmount

transparency hurdles to prove their case.1 56 The maps ultimately did go
down, but not until 2018 after many more expensive and fraught months
of litigation.1 57 Had the process been more transparent, perhaps litigants

and Pennsylvania courts could have been spared years of run-around.
Michigan, which also received a CPI grade of F, experienced a
similar phenomenon.1 58 Litigation over Michigan's maps in the 2010
round raged throughout the decade, culminating in a temporary victory
for plaintiffs on partisan gerrymandering grounds in 2019.159 In League
of Women Voters of Michigan v. Benson, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan noted with displeasure the degree to

which legislators drew their maps in secret:
During the spring of 2011, Michigan's Republican leadership held
weekly meetings on Thursday mornings at the Dickinson Wright law

firm to discuss their redistricting efforts.

...

The Republican leadership

took several steps to ensure that these weekly redistricting meetings

remained secret. Members of the Republican leadership and their staffs
often used personal-rather than governmental-email addresses to
60
communicate about the redistricting meetings.1

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering claims
were not justiciable later that same year in Rucho, wiping away the
Michigan plaintiff's victory. 161 But the egregious nature of the secretive

line drawing effort, as in other states, prompted sympathy from the lower

155. Id. at 1239-40.
156. See id at 1242-43.
157. See League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 741.

158. See infra App. C.
159. League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Benson, 373 F. Supp. 3d 867, 886-87, 960 (E.D.
Mich. 2019), vacated sub nom., Chatfield v. League of Women Voters of Michigan, 140 S.
Ct. 429 (2019) (briefly striking Michigan's map until Supreme Court declared partisan
gerrymandering suits nonjusticiable later that same year).

160. Id. at 886-87.
161. Chatfield, 140 S. Ct. at 429-30 (mem.) (remanded in light of Rucho v. Common
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019)).
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courts-and served as an argument for reformers seeking to adopt an
independent commission to draw lines.1 62
Wisconsin (CPI grade of F) also spent the decade enmeshed in
litigation and also saw its process transparency failures highlighted in
court. 163 The Wisconsin legislature's maps prevailed against a partisan

gerrymandering challenge, but only after years of court battles until the
Supreme Court ended the litigation in 2019.164 Along the way, court after
court called out line drawers for the lack of transparency in the process.1 65
In one early case challenging the maps on equipopulation and VRA

grounds (unsuccessfully), the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin took time to scold the mapmakers:
...

[Al]though the drafting of [the maps] was needlessly secret,

regrettably

excluding input from the overwhelming

majority of

Wisconsin citizens ... the resulting population deviations are not large
enough to permit judicial intervention under the Supreme Court's
precedents.16 6

In the groundbreaking 2016 case Whitford v. Gill, which marked the
first time a federal court struck state maps as unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander, the district court did not belabor the lack of transparency in
the process even though it had been egregious by all accounts. 167 It did
discuss how partisan line drawers consulted Republican legislators only;
the court dryly recites the accelerated schedule once the maps were
introduced to the public and quickly passed:
On July 11, 2011, the redistricting plan was introduced by the
Committee on Senate Organization. On July 13, 2011, a public hearing

was held, during which [political consultants] presented the plan and
fielded questions. The Senate and Assembly passed the bill on July 19,
2011, and July 20, 2011, respectively. The Governor signed the bill, and
it was published as Wisconsin Act 43 on August 23, 2011.168

But there is little question that Wisconsin's secretive process-

complete

with

Republican

lawmakers

signing

nondisclosure

162. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2525 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137 (1803)).
163. See infra App. C.
164. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2487.
165. See id. at 2525 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
166. Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 860 (E.D.
Wis. 2012).
167. See 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 965 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct.
1916 (2018).
168. Id. at 853; see also Whitford v. Nichol, 151 F. Supp. 3d 918, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2015)
("The plan was drafted in secret and without any input from Democrats.").
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agreements-fueled intense scrutiny of the maps rather than perhaps the
hoped-for effect of "... nothing to see here." 69
Many of the cases described above in which courts called out a lack
of transparency in the line drawing process involved partisan
gerrymandering claims. By their very nature, partisan gerrymandering

efforts are at their core about shutting one party-and by extension the
public-out of the process. 7 0 It should therefore come as no surprise that
many lower court decisions evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims

detail the lack of transparency with the same frustration that motivated
plaintiffs to file suit.

The above examples indicate that courts take note of redistricting
transparency measures when deciding redistricting cases. Sometimes
positive or negative transparency assessments prove critical to the
outcome. Other times courts took liberties in framing transparency to suit

a chosen outcome. And other times courts take pains to highlight
egregious transparency shortcomings even when those observations were
ultimately irrelevant to the legal standard applied. In each instance,
judges in the last decade called line drawers out for transparency
successes and failings. The implication? Greater transparency reduces
courts' ire and provides maps legitimizing force.
B. Transparency& the Intent Analysis
In the decade that followed the 2011 redistricting round, legal

standards often required courts to examine whether line drawers
proceeded with unlawful intent or purpose. This analysis often included
an examination of the degree of process transparency. When courts were

unable to determine intent because line drawers shrouded the process,
courts drew adverse inferences against them. The most compelling

169. See, e.g., Associated Press, Report: GOP Lawmakers Signed Redistricting Secrecy
Deals, Wis. STATE J. (Feb. 7, 2012), https://madison.com/wsj/news/oca/govt-and-

politics/report-gop-lawmakers-signed-redistricting-secrecy-deals/article_2867657e-51a81 lel-b647-001871e3ce6c.html ("Nearly all of Wisconsin's Republican state lawmakers took
the unusual step of signing a legal agreement in which they promised to not comment publicly
about redistricting discussions while new GOP-friendly maps were being drafted, a
newspaper reported. The agreement was included in newly released documents in a federal
lawsuit challenging the new district lines. Also included in the documents was a GOP memo
outlining talking points that stressed anyone who discussed the maps could be called as a
witness in the case. The memo also warned Republicans to ignore public comments about the
maps and focus instead on what was being said in private strategy meetings.").
170. See Alex Tausanovitch, The Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS
(Oct.
1,
2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2019/10/01/475166/impactpartisan-gerrymandering/.
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examples of this phenomenon comes in redistricting opinions from
Florida and Texas.
Returning to the Sunshine State, Florida's constitutional provision
prohibiting political influence in line drawing requires courts to examine
legislative intent. The only way a court can determine whether line
drawing intentionally favored or disfavored a political party or incumbent
is to engage in an analysis of the legislative motive. 171
During the contentious discovery process, this reality proved

pivotal. Plaintiffs sought redistricting materials from the legislature and
third parties relevant to the reapportionment process. 172 The Legislature
filed a motion to prevent discovery citing legislative privilege. 7 3 After a
fight in the lower courts, 174 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
legislative privilege applies to and protects documents

revealing

"thoughts or impressions," but does not apply to or protect "information
or communications pertaining to the 2012 reapportionment process."175

The court held that legislative privilege is not absolute particularly when
other compelling, competing interests are at stake. 176 The court held that

compliance with section 20(a) of the Florida constitution satisfied the
"compelling,

competing"

interest

test.1 77

Florida's

constitutional

prohibition of improper partisan intent in redistricting, the court held,
could not be enforced without access to discovery necessary to determine
whether the Legislature engaged in improper actions. 178
But peeling back legislative privilege giving access in discovery to

third-party consultant documents only got plaintiffs so far. Plaintiffs
found no smoking gun and were able to map out only skeletal evidence
pointing to the existence of a shadow process. 179 It turned out that those
working on the maps destroyed quite a bit of evidence that might have

171. See discussion supra Part II (discussing Florida's state constitutional amendment
prohibiting partisanship in legislative line drawing).

172. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d
135, 141 (Fla. 2013).
173. Id. Third party consultants also tried to shield documents from discovery, ultimately
unsuccessfully. See Bainter v. League of Women Voters of Fla., 150 So. 3d 1115, 1118-19
(Fla. 2014) (quoting Barron v. Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla.
1988)).
174. See League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at 141-42.
175. Id. at 154.
176. Id. at 145-46 (first quoting Chiles v. Children A, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991); and
then quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)).
177. See id. at 147.
178. See id. at 149.
179. See Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA-000412, 2014 WL 3797315, at *11 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
July 10, 2014).
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been relevant to determining legislative intent.1 80 Faced with these
obfuscations, the court determined the only fair way to proceed would be
draw an adverse inference against the line drawers. 1 8 1
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the adverse inference
approach.' 82 Reviewing the trial court's determination that legislators had
violated Florida's constitution and chastising line drawers for their lack
of transparency and overt destruction of evidence, the Florida Supreme
Court noted that,
[T]he spoliation of evidence results in an adverse inference against the
party that discarded or destroyed the evidence.. . . The trial court was,
therefore, justified in drawing an adverse inference against the
Legislature in adjudicating the challengers' claim of unconstitutional
partisan intent. And we too must consider the Legislature's
"systematic[] delet[ion]" of redistricting records in evaluating whether
the trial court's finding is supported by competent, substantial
evidence.' 83

Had Florida line drawers pursued a more transparent (and less
devious) line drawing strategy, they may have avoided this adverse
inference (depending of course on what more sunlight might have
revealed!) The U.S. Supreme Court previously ruled that absent evidence,

legislatures should be given the benefit of the doubt.1 84 Line drawers
beware: a lack of transparency may overcome that presumption.' 85
Other legal triggers requiring courts to examine legislative motive

plunge courts into examining the reasons line drawers made the choices
they did. One good example are VRA section 2 claims brought against
86
Precedent in
line drawers for diluting minority voting strength.'

deciding section 2 claims specifically releases plaintiffs from the often
impossible task of uncovering a smoking gun of overt racial
discrimination in line drawing.1 87 Instead, part of the section 2 analysis,
as it has developed in the redistricting realm, borrows from the Arlington
180. See id. at *6 ("The legislature had, in fact, destroyed e-mails and other evidence of
communication regarding the non-party political consultants.").

181. See id. at *9.
182. League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 416 (Fla. 2015).
183. Id. at 391.
184. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (holding that "the good faith of a state
legislature must be presumed") (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 31819 (1978)).
185. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
186. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986).
187. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999) (noting that "outright
admissions of impermissible racial motivation are infrequent and plaintiffs often must rely
upon other evidence").
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Heights equal protection frame asking plaintiffs to provide evidence that
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor.1 88

As courts review complex evidence of what motivated line drawing
decisions, a lack of transparency can work against line drawers. This
happened in Texas, which earned an abysmal CPI grade of F1 89 and
endured years and years of litigation over its legislative lines.1 90

'

Texas' tale of redistricting litigation woe in the last round began
immediately after it drew ill-fated lines following the 2010 Census.' 9
Plaintiffs brought VRA and U.S. constitutional challenges against state
senate and house lines.1 92 Separately, the legislature sought preclearance
at the District Court for the District of Columbia.1 93 While the maps
wound their way through the courts, a three-judge panel in Texas drew
up interim maps for use in the 2012 primaries.1 94 The state of Texas

challenged the court's interim maps arguing that the judge-made interim
maps had failed to show proper deference to the original legislative
maps.1 95 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, ordering the district court to
start with the legislature's maps as the basis for its remediation.1 96
Meanwhile, the district court for the District of Columbia denied the 2011
maps preclearance.1 97 As a result, Texas used the revised interim map for

the 2012 general election.1 98 Then came Shelby County v. Holder in 2013
which removed the preclearance requirement.

199

The Texas legislature

quickly repealed its 2011 plans and adopted the court's revised interim

188. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)
("[R]acial discrimination is not just another competing consideration. When there is a proof
that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, .

..

judicial

deference is no longer justified.").
189. Texas' CPI grade covered only its original map drawing process following the 2010
Census, not subsequent efforts in the twisted tale as the decade unfolded. See discussion,
supra note 30.

190. See infra App. C.
191. Texas received a CPI grade of F and endured and excruciating decade of litigation
over its lines. See infra App. C.

192. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2310 (2018) (describing the litigation that unfolded
immediately after the Texas legislature passed its maps).
193. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 114 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, 570 U.S. 928
(2013).
194. See generally Perez v. Perry, 835 F. Supp. 2d 209 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated and
remanded, 565 U.S. 388 (2012) (ordering a court-drawn interim map).
195. See Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 392 (2012) (per curiam).
196. See id. at 399.
197. See Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 178 (D.D.C. 2012).
198. See id. at 139.
199. See 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
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map with some modification.200 In the litigation challenging those 2013
lines, the Texas legislature's continued lack of transparency displeased
the federal district court. 20 1
In Perez v. Abbott in 2017 the Western District of Texas assessed a

variety of factors to determine whether discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor behind the 2013 congressional lines. 202 The plaintiffs
pointed to the lack of transparency in the line drawing process, noting
that it was unnecessarily exclusionary, secretive, and rushed. 203 The

defendants brought forward an expert who testified that he did not believe
the process was particularly rushed, but the court rejected the claim. 204
"The timeline," the court concluded, "speaks for itself." 205 Throughout
the court's examination of legislative intent in Perez v. Abbott are
discussions of the lack of transparency-describing proposals being
drawn "in secret," 2 06 noting that "[e]ven Senate redistricting committee
lawyers were not shown the plan before it was released" 207 and pointing
out that "[m]inority members of the house and senate redistricting
committees were generally shut out of the mapdrawing process." 208

These transparency shortfalls supported the ruling against the
defendant line drawers, which ultimately found discriminatory intent:
[W]e examine the process to glean insight into whether there was
discriminatory purpose, and the inquiry is not limited solely to
comparing this process to prior processes for deviations. In this case,

the rushed and secretive process suggests that Defendants did want to
avoid scrutiny of whether their efforts in fact complied with the VRA
or were intended to do so, or whether they were only creating a facade
of compliance. 209
A lack of process transparency thus proved fatal to Texas' U.S.

congressional district lines.
In litigation over whether the state house districts violated the VRA,
the court likewise pointed to the lack of process transparency in support
of its finding that the legislature had unlawful discriminatory intent:
200. See
generally
Redistricting
History,
TEX.
RED1STRICTING,
https://redistricting.capitol.texas.gov/history (last visited May 10, 2021) (describing the very

twisted tale of Texas redistricting in the 2010s).
201. See Perez v. Abbott, 253 F. Supp. 3d 864, 961 (W.D. Tex. 2017).

202. See id. at 945.
203. Id. at 960.
204. See id.
205. Id.

206.
207.
208.
209.

253 F. Supp. 3d at 960.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 961.
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Although delegations worked on their respective areas, the overall map

was drawn in secret, with no one seeing the statewide map until [the
plan] was released on Wednesday, April 13.... After ...

April 13, the

process was extremely rushed, with public hearings on Friday, April 15
and Sunday, April 17, and the plan voted out after the [redistricting
committee] meeting on Tuesday, April 19 ...

.1

Texas' long and tortured years of litigation following the original
2011 maps provide a cautionary tale of how not to avoid litigation. The
legislature's secretive approach in 2011 and 2013 drew ire from
reviewing courts contributing to negative judgments. As described above,

the hurried nature and lack of public input led to lower courts' adverse
inferences regarding legislative intent. 211
By the time the U.S. Supreme Court got involved in Abbott v. Perez

in 2018, the five-four majority overturned the lower courts' findings of
discriminatory intent. 2 12 A key reason: the Supreme Court majority took
a different position on process fairness.2 13 Rather than crediting the
plaintiffs' characterization, the Court declined to designate legislative
actions in 2013 as "rushed." 2 14 Instead, the Court endorsed the state's

rationale that it pushed through the modified interim maps quickly only
as a means of staving off more litigation-not in an attempt to obfuscate
the process. 2 15 Importantly for present purposes, the majority could not
rule as it did without first explaining away the lower courts' and the
dissent's transparency criticisms. 2 16 The Supreme Court did not upend
the adverse inference approach, rather it found a way around it by
justifying the rush.217

210. Perez v. Abbott, 250 F. Supp. 3d 123, 178, 179 (W.D. Tex. 2017) ("The Task Force
Plaintiffs further note the rushed process with limited opportunity for public input .... ").
211. See supra text accompanying notes 172-79.

212. See 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313 (2018).
213. See id.
214. See generally id. (failing to call the process "rushed").
215. Id. at 2328-29 ("[W]e do not see how the brevity of the legislative process can give
rise to an inference of bad faith-and certainly not an inference that is strong enough to
overcome the presumption of legislative good faith . . .. The 'special session' was necessary
because the regular session had ended. ... [T]he Legislature had good reason to believe that
the interim plans were sound, and the adoption of those already-completed plans did not
require a prolonged process. After all, part of the reason for adopting those plans was to avoid
the time and expense of starting from scratch and leaving the electoral process in limbo while
that occurred.").
216. See id. at 2348 ("[The legislature] avoided the 'full public notice and hearing' that
would have allowed "'meaningful input"' from all Texans, including the minority
community."').
217. See Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2328-29.
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Florida and Texas' experiences reveal that when legal standards
require courts to evaluate legislative motive or intent-as they often docourts faced with non-transparent processes are likely to adopt adverse
inferences against line drawers. A lack of transparency in the process

works against line drawers' efforts to defend their maps in court.2 18
Conducting business in secret and without meaningful public input leads
courts to suspect wrongdoing. 219 The easy solution? Make the process
more transparent-and not as a matter of lip service. Supplying provable

instances of an open and fair process, allowing public access to meetings
and data, seeking and absorbing public input, and setting reasonable
timelines can go a long way to insulate line drawers from courts' wrath.
V. WILL RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE SAVE STATES WITH UNFAIR MAPS
FROM REDISTRICTING LITIGATION? (UNLIKELY)

Partisan gerrymandering claims filled dockets around the country.220
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court held partisan gerrymandering
claims nonjusticiable in 2019 in Rucho v. Common Cause.2 2 ' Can we
expect a marked reduction in partisan gerrymandering litigation in the

coming decade as a result of the Supreme Court's erasure of this federal
claim?2 2 2 Indeed, the argument that declaring partisan gerrymandering
nonjusticiable would reduce litigation supplied a big part of the Court's
reasoning.2 23 Does the Court's holding in Rucho free state legislatures to
engage in secretive line drawing processes without fear of litigation now

that partisan gerrymandering claims can no longer be brought in federal
court?
At least two factors support the likelihood that Common Cause v.

Rucho will not stem the tide of redistricting litigation in the coming
decade. First, creative litigants are already finding success claiming

218. See Perez v. Abbott, 253 F. Supp. 3d 864, 961 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (noting the "rushed
and secretive process" in evaluating whether there was discriminatory purpose).

219. See Perez v. Abbott, 250 F. Supp. 3d 123, 172 (W.D. Tex. 2017) ("The Court finds
that mapdrawers acted with racially discriminatory intent to dilute Latino voting strength in
Tarrant County.").
220. See infra App. C.

221. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. at 2506-07.
222. See Vieth v. Jubelifer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) ("Eighteen years of essentially
pointless litigation have persuaded us that [precedent provides no discernable standard to
adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims]. We would therefore overrule that case, and
decline to adjudicate these political gerrymandering claims.").

223. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 ("The expansion of judicial authority [into partisan
gerrymandering] would be unlimited in scope and duration-it would recur over and over
again around the country with each new round of districting, for state as well as federal
representatives.").
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partisan gerrymandering violations under state law.22 a Second, in past

decades, the lack of a direct path to challenging unfair maps on federal
partisan gerrymandering grounds fueled complex and time-intensive
indirect lawsuits that spill more litigation ink than a more direct path
would have provided.22 s These two trends are very likely to continue.
A. State-Level PartisanGerrymanderingClaims

Even before the dramatic culmination of decades of partisan
gerrymandering claims under the U.S. Constitution in Rucho v. Common

Cause, plaintiffs had already been experimenting with partisan
gerrymandering claims under state constitutions-and successfully. In
both Pennsylvania and North Carolina, egregious process unfairness
(both states received a CPI grade of F) that produced classically lopsided
maps, prompted plaintiffs to get creative. Litigants in both states brought
a variety of what might be termed indirect lawsuits challenging maps on
racial gerrymandering, one person one vote, VRA, and other grounds to
varying degrees of success. But, in both states, partisan gerrymandering

suits based on state constitutional protections hit the nail on the unfair
maps' coffin.
State level partisan gerrymandering claims might emanate from a
variety of provisions in state statutory and constitutional protections.
State constitutions all contain provisions protecting freedom of speech,

forty-seven state constitutions protect the freedom of association, and
twenty-four guarantee the equal protection of the laws. 2 2 6 Even when
such language mirrors federal constitutional provisions, state courts
commonly interpret state constitutions more broadly. 227 Virtually all state
constitutions include protections for the right to vote. 228 Twenty-six state
constitutions include an explicit protection that the federal constitution

224. See, e.g., Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. Ct. LEXIS
56, at * 10 (Wake Cnty. Sept. 3, 2019); see also League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth,
178 A.3d 737, 741 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom., Turzai v. Brandt, 139 S. Ct. 445 (2018).
225. See infra App. C.
226. See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Richard F. Ober, & Ben Williams, Laboratories of
Democracy Reform: State Constitutions and PartisanGerrymandering, 22 U. PA. J. CONST.

L. 203, 231-32 (2019); see also James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party:
Lessons from State ConstitutionalAttempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERs L. J.

881, 887-89 (2006) (discussing state constitutions and how courts have historically applied
them to partisan gerrymanders).
227. See id.
228. Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REv.
89, 91 (2014) ("Virtually every state constitution confers the right to vote to its citizens in
explicit terms.").
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does not contain: the right to a free and fair election. 229 Litigants have
already shown that state founding documents are fertile grounds in the
quest to slay gerrymandering.

Pennsylvania and North Carolina litigation demonstrates the
willingness of state courts to extend state constitutional protections
against gerrymandering that federal courts post-Rucho cannot. As the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court aptly articulated, "While federal courts
have, to date, been unable to settle on a workable standard by which to
assess such claims under the federal Constitution, we find no such
barriers under our great Pennsylvania charter." 230 The Rucho majority

effectively blessed Pennsylvania's muscular use of state constitutional
provisions to police gerrymandering by summarily denying certiorari in
the Pennsylvania case.23 1

In North Carolina, the state superior court in Wake County likewise
struck legislative maps as partisan gerrymanders in violation of the state
constitution. 2 32 North Carolina's redistricting committee partisan

gerrymandered with abandon, and did so explicitly. 233 Republican
legislator David Lewis famously admitted that the map had been drawn
to guarantee as many Republican seats as possible. 234 Despite the near
even split between Democrats and Republicans in the North Carolina
electorate in 2012,235 Representative Lewis explained that he drew a U.S.
congressional map that would elect ten Republicans and three

Democrats. 236 Why? Because he did "not believe it's possible to draw a
map with [eleven] Republicans and two Democrats." 23 7 Lewis clarified

229. Id. at 103 (providing a valuable assessment of protections for voting in state
constitutions).

230. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 741 (Pa. 2018).
231. See generally Turzai v. Brandt, 139 S. Ct. 445 (2018) (denying cert.).
232. See Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. Ct. LEXIS 56,
at *413 (Wake Cnty. Sept. 3, 2019).
233. See id. at *372.
234.
235.
shares
48.4%

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.
Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, at *17 ("In the 2012 elections, the parties' vote
for the House were nearly evenly split across the state, with Democrats receiving
of the two-party statewide vote.").

236. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491 (quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777,
809 (M.D.N.C. 2018)).
237. See id. (quoting Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 808); Ralph Hise & David Lewis,
We Drew CongressionalMapsfor PartisanAdvantage. That Was the Point., ATLANTIC (Mar.
25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/ralph-hise-and-david-lewisnc-genymandering/585619/.
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that he pushed for a lopsided map because he believed electing
Republicans was better for the country than electing Democrats. 238
In striking the map on state constitutional grounds, the North
Carolina court called out the closed-door nature of the process:
[Defendants' redistricting expert] Dr. [Thomas] Hofeller drew the 2017
Plans under the direction of Legislative Defendants and without
consultation with any Democratic members. Representative Lewis

claimed that he "primarily ... directed how the [House] map was
produced," and that he, Dr. Hofeller, and Republican Representative
Nelson Dollar were the only "three people" who had even "seen it prior
to its public publication." None of Legislative Defendants' meetings

with Dr. Hofeller about the 2017 redistricting were public. 239

In both the Pennsylvania and North Carolina opinions, reviewing
courts carefully detailed the egregious lack of process fairness that shut
political opponents and members of the public out of meaningfully
participating in the line drawing process.2 40
As these two examples demonstrate, state courts interpreting state

laws are likely to be far more creative and expansive in applying state
constitutional protections to police maps that are the product of an unfair
process. In short, courts are likely to carefully examine process fairness
in state law-driven partisan gerrymandering lawsuits in the coming
decade.
B. IndirectAvenues to Attack Unfair Maps Likely to Proliferate

The Supreme Court's removal of partisan gerrymandering claims
from the hands of federal courts will no doubt hamper plaintiffs' ability
to police unfairness in the process. But if the past is any guide, plaintiffs
will continue to challenge egregious maps. Unable to bring partisan

'

gerrymandering claims in federal court, scholars predict that plaintiffs
will continue to pursue other ways to attack the lines-whether through
state constitutional claims described above or through federal law
hooks.2 4
238. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491 (quoting Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 809) ("I think
electing
better
than
is
Republicans
electing
Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the country.").
239. Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, at *27-28 (omission in original) (internal citations
omitted).
240. Id. at *29-30. The court described in detail the tight timeline between when the maps
were revealed to the public (August 22, 2017) and passed (August 31, 2017), and despite
public commentary, "overwhelmingly they were saying that they wanted districts drawn that
were not partisan in nature." Id. at *30.

241. See generally, e.g., Douglas, supra note 230 (discussing state constitutional claims
against gerrymandering).
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In an amicus brief submitted during the Wisconsin partisan
gerrymandering litigation, Professor Pam Karlan and other academic
signatories242 argued that "[t]he absence of a straightforward mechanism
for adjudicating claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering ha[d]
led to troubling distortions" in redistricting litigation. 243 Without a
straightforward mechanism to police hyper-partisanship in line drawing,
Karlan argued, plaintiffs find other legal hooks to challenge fundamental
unfairness. 24 4 The U.S. Supreme Court chose to bypass this reasoning, 24

but this does not diminish the likelihood that Professor Karlan is right.
As discussed above, plaintiffs routinely levy one person one vote,
racial gerrymandering, and VRA claims to challenge maps that result
from unfair redistricting processes. 246 Without a direct route via federal
partisan gerrymandering to address partisan unfairness in districting,

plaintiffs have at their disposal no shortage of vehicles to challenge the
lines under state and federal law. 2 47 If the past several decades are any
indication, such "indirect" suits will be complicated, messy, and
prolonged. Line drawers can avoid riling would-be plaintiffs and win the

favor of reviewing courts by taking pains to ensure the process is
transparent and fair and includes public buy-in at every stage.
The nonjusticiability of partisan gerrymandering claims is unlikely,
as some may have hoped, to reduce the amount of redistricting litigation
in the coming decade. As the Karlan brief succinctly put it, "In some areas
of law, litigation would largely dry up if this Court were to hold a
particular claim nonjusticiable. Redistricting is not one of them."248
CONCLUSION

Line drawers aiming to stave off litigation would be wise to heed the
lessons of the 2011 round of redistricting litigation. A meaningfully

transparent redistricting process in which line drawers hold public
meetings, make redistricting data open and accessible, facilitate public
input and buy-in, and release maps in a timely manner allowing the public
ample time to weigh the costs and benefits of proposals, are less likely to

242. Including this Article's author.
243. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Appellees at 20, Gill v. Whitford,
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161).
244. See id. at 6.
245. See generally Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (vacating and remanding judgment for the

plaintiffs).
246. See discussion supra pp. 2016-18.
247. See infra App. C.
248. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Appellees at 6, Gill v. Whitford,
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) (alteration in original).
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draw litigant ire. Line drawers that hide behind lip-service transparency
may well be found out, particularly if their machinations produce unfair
maps.

We learned in the last decade that reform efforts around the country
did not necessarily reduce the amount of litigation that states
experienced. 24 9 Sometimes political headwinds blow too hard. And yet,
even in those states, courts reviewing maps clearly cared about
transparency. Despite the legal complexities of redistricting litigation and
the somersaults that legal standards often require courts to perform, the
narrative of whether or not the process was fair is very often the subtext
that animates courts' treatment of maps. Winning the narrative battle by

establishing a genuinely fair and transparent process builds goodwill that
can help convince both would-be plaintiffs and courts to bless the maps.
Line drawers drawing maps in 2021 face challenges, not the least of
which involved navigating U.S. Census delays and involving the public
in the process despite pandemic conditions.2 0 Another challenge is
drawing lines in an environment unlike any their predecessors faced. The
2020 round featured important advances in redistricting drawing and
assessment tools freely available to the public and an abundance of
influential and sophisticated organizations dedicated to using technology
to inform the public about whether maps are fair.251
Relatedly, line drawers going forward face a public that cares. 2 2
Redistricting used to be a sleepy topic that only the most wonky knew or
cared about. No more. Gerrymandering has become a front-page issue as
communities around the country have woken up to the harms line
drawing trickery can unleash. 25 3 Technological tools at the disposal of
this newly-awakened public should translate to line drawers being able to
get away with far less.

249. See infra App. C.
250. See Census Bureau Statement on RedistrictingData Timeline, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/statement2021),
(Feb.
12,
redistricting-data-timeline.html.

251. Great examples of new organizations established in the last decade to help the public
police the lines include the Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group at Tufts, MGGG
REDISTRICTING LAB, https://mggg.org (last visited May 10, 2021); THE PRINCETON
GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, http://gerrymander.princeton.edu (last visited May 10, 2021);
REPRESENTABLE, https://representable.org (last visited May 10, 2021); and PLANSCORE,

https://planscore.org (last visited May 10, 2021) (providing tools for policymakers and
litigators and members of the public to transparently score new plans and assess their
fairness).
252. See Green, supra note 5, at 1790-91.
253. See id.
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What can we learn from the last decade of redistricting litigation?
States that see and accept new realities of redistricting and react by
ensuring a transparent and fair redistricting process have real hope of
staving off litigation. Conversely, line drawers that think they can pull a
fast one behind closed doors should gird for irritated litigants and judges
alike.
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APPENDIX A

CPI 2012 Redistricting Process Transparency Metrics

The Center for Public Integrity (CPI) used the following list of
questions as its basis for state CPI grades to answer the general question
"Is the state redistricting process open and transparent?"
326. In practice, for the latest redistricting round, public meetings were
or are being held on the redistricting process.
327. In practice, for the latest redistricting round, public hearings were
or are being held to solicit input on new district maps.
328. In practice, for the latest redistricting round, schedules of these
meeting and/or hearings were or are available to the public.
329. In practice, for the latest redistricting round, the state government
accepted or is accepting redistricting plans submitted by the public.
330. In practice, for the latest redistricting round, the government made
or is making a redistricting website or online source of redistricting
information available to the public.
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State CPI Grade Detail

326.
State

Public

327.

Meetin

Solicit

328.
Meeting

330.
Grade

Accepting Online

Schedules Plans
Publicly

Meetings?

329.

from

In

AvailablePublic?

Source Score
for

(CPI)

Public?

Alabama

50

50

50

25

125

40

F

Alaska

50

50

50

50

50

50

F

Arizona

100

100

75

100

100

95

A

Arkansas

75

75

75

0

100

65

`D

California

100

100

100

100

100

100

A

Colorado

75

75

100

50

70

C-

100

!100

100

100

100

'A

Connecticut 1100

150

Delaware

'75

75

100

50

100

80

B-

Florida

100

100

100

100

100

100

A

Georgia

50

25

75

0

75

45

F

Hawaii

100

75

100

75

100

90

A-

Idaho

100

100

100

100

100

100

A

Illinois

75

150

!25

50

50

50

F

Indiana

50

50

75

'50

25

50

F

Iowa

100

100

100

100

100

100

A

Kansas

75

100

:100

7

100

0

A-

5

State
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326.
Public
Meetings

327.

328.

329.

330.

Accepting Online
Meetings Meeting
Source
Schedules Plans
Solicit
for
Publicly from

Input?

fAvailablefPublic?

Public?

Grade

Score (CPI)

Louisiana

75

75

75

25

100

70

C-

Maine

50

50

50

100

0

50

F

Maryland

50

25

100

25

100

60

!D-

Massachusetts 100

100

100

50

100

90

A-

Mississippi

100

100

100

100

100

100

A

Montana

100

100

100

75

100

95

A

Michigan

25

25

25

25

75

35

F

Minnesota

50

0

75

25

50

40

F

Missouri

75

75

50

50

100

70

C-

Nebraska

100

100

100

75

100

95

A

Nevada

50

50

75

50

100

65

D

New Jersey

100

100

100

75

75

90

A-

5

0

0

0

25

10

F

New Mexico

100

75

100

100

80

B-

New York

50

50

75

25

50

50

F

0

25

75

5

100

45

F

North Dakota 25

25

50

25

0

25

F

Ohio

25

3

50

50

30

New

Hampshire

5

North

Carolina

25

g
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g Accepting Online
326.
Source
MeingSchedules Plans
Public
for
from
Meetings?. Iublicly

327.

328.

329.

Available? Public?

330.
Score (CaI)

(CPD

Public?

100

100

75

100

95

A

Pennsylvania 75

25

100

0

50

50

F

Rhode Island 75

75

100

100

100

90

A-

75

75

100

50

100

80

B-

Dakota

100

100

75

75

50

80

B-

Texas

100

25

25

'0

100

50

F

Tennessee

25

25

25

50

100

45

F

Utah

25

50

100

0

100

55

F

Vermont

100

100

100

100

100

100

*A

Virginia

100

75

100

0

100

75

C

Washington 100

100

100

100

100

100

A

West
Virginia

75

25

50

50

50

50

F

Wisconsin

0

0

0

0

75

15

F

Wyoming

100

100

100

100

100

100

A

Oregon

100

South

'Carolina
South
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APPENDIX C

State Redistricting Litigation Following 2010 Census

The following lists redistricting cases by state, organized by
descending CPI grade. Cases are drawn from the All About Redistricting
website, which collects and organized state redistricting litigation
documents.2 54 In an effort to capture only instances in which plaintiffs
brought claims challenging the work of line drawers, this listing excludes
Department of Justice preclearance actions2 55 and litigation involving
ballot initiative efforts to change a state's redistricting process.

CPI
Grade

State

Citation

Date
Filed/Date
Resolved

Federal/
State

A

AZ

State ex rel. Montgomery v.
Mathis, 231 Ariz. 103 (Ct. App.
2012).

9/7/201112/11/2012

State

Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep.

6/7/2012-

Federal

Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S.
787 (2015).

6/29/2015

v.
Harris
Redistricting

Indep.
Ariz.
136
Comm'n,

4/27/20124/20/2016

Federal

4/27/2012-

State

S.Ct. 1301 (2016).
Leach

A

CA

v.

Ariz.

Indep.

RedistrictingComm'n

3/16/2016

Connerly v. California, 229 Cal.
App. 4th 457 (2014).

3/20/20129/3/2014

State

Vandermost v. Bowen, 53 Cal.

9/15/2011-

State

4th 421 (2012).

1/27/2012

254. See ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, https://redistricting.lis.edu (May 10, 2021).

255. I.e., prior to the demise of section 5 of the VRA in 2013, see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder,
570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
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A
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CT

v.

Bowen,

2012

9/29/2011-

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199349 (C.D.
Ca. 2012).

2/9/2012

NAACP v. Merrill, 939 F.3d 470
(2d Cir. 2019).

6/28/20189/24/2019

of 12/2/2011Petition
re
In
Reapportionment Comm'n, 303 2/10/2012

Federal

Federal

State

Conn. 798 (2012).
A

FL

Brown v. Detzner, No. 4:15-cv-

8/12/2015-

00398 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2016)

4/18/2016

Warinner v. Detzner, No. 6:13-

12/2/2013-

cv-01860 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27,
2014).

3/27/2014

Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of 3/9/2015-

Comm'rs, 172 F.Supp.3d 1292
(N.D. Fla. 2016).

4/18/2016

No.

2/9/2012-

2012CA000412 (Cir. Ct. Fla.
Aug. 14, 2015).

8/14/2015

Voters v.

9/5/2012-

Detzner, 172 So.3d 363, 404-06
(Fla. 2015).

7/10/2015

Kostickv. Nago, 960 F. Supp. 2d

4/6/12-

1074 (D. Haw. 2013).

1/21/2014

Romo

v.

Detzner,

League of Women

A

HI

Solomon v. Abercrombie,

270

10/10/2011

State

Federal

Federal

State

State

Federal

State

P.3d 1013 (Haw. 2012).

- 1/6/2012

2011
Matsukawa
v. Haw.
Comm 'n,
Reapportionment

11/8/20111/4/2012

State

Denney v. Ysursa, No. 39570-

1/20/2012-

State

2012 (Idaho Jan. 25, 2012).

1/25/2012

2012 WL 57152 (Haw. 2012).
A

ID
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9/7/20119/9/2011

State

11/16/2011
- 1/18/2012

State

12/7/20111/28/2012

State

Essex v. Kobach, 874 F. Supp.
2d 1069 (D. Kan. 2012).

5/3/20126/7/2012

Federal

Thomas v. Reeves, 961 F.3d 800
(5th Cir. 2020).

7/25/20186/18/2020

Federal

NAACP v. Barbour, No. 3:11- 3/17/2011cv-00159, 2011 WL 1870222 5/20/2013
(S.D. Miss. May 16, 2011),
aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 542 (2011).

Federal

852 F.

9/12/2011-

Federal

Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. Miss. 2011).

12/30/2011

Buck v. Barbour, No. 3:11-cv-

10/2011-

00717 (S.D. Miss. 2011).

12/2011

Willems v. Montana, 325 P.3d

3/14/2013-

1204 (Mont. 2014).

3/26/2014

Frasure v. Idaho Redistricting

39127-2011
Comm'n, No.
(Idaho Sept. 9, 2011).
Twin Falls Cnty. v. Idaho
Comm'n on Redistricting, 271

P.3d 1202 (Idaho 2012).
Benewah County v. Idaho
Comm'n on Redistricting, No.

38373-2011
2012).
A

IA

A

KS

A

MA

A

MS

(Idaho Jan.

Smith v. Hosemann,

A

MT

A

NE

A

NJ

LaVergne

v.

Bryson,

28,

497

Fed.Appx. 219 (3d Cir. 2012).

12/6/2011-

9/20/2012

Federal

State

Federal

A

A
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OR

RI

Gonzalez v. McManus, No. A-

4/20/2011-

0747-11T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Sept. 10, 2012).

9/10/2012

Meeker

v.

Kitzhaber,

No.

5/17/2011-

110197 (Cir. Ct. Or., Yamhill
June 10, 2011).

6/10/2011

Puyana v. Rhode Island, C.A.

5/8/2012-

No. PC12-1272 (R.I. Super. Ct.,

5/29/2013

State

State

State

Providence May 30, 2013).
A

VT

A

WA

2/8/201811/2/2012

State

4/5/201211/30/2015

State

Chavez-Hankins v. Duran, No.

2/13/2012-

Federal

1:12-cv-00140 (D. N.M. Apr.
13, 2012).

4/13/2012

Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66

1/27/2012

(N.M. 2012).

(opening

State
In re 2012 Wash.
Redistricting Plan, No. 86976-6

(Wash. S. Ct. Nov. 2, 2012).
A

WY

Hunzie v. Maxfield, No. 179-562
(Wyo. Dist. Ct., Laramie Cnty.

Nov. 30, 2015).
B-

DE

B-

NM

State

-

brief filed)

2/21/2012
B-

SC

B-

SD

C

CO

Backus v. South Carolina, 857

11/11/2011

F. Supp. 2d 553 (D.S.C. 2012),
aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 156 (2012).

- 3/9/2012

In re Reapportionment of Colo.
General Assembly, 332 P.3d 108

10/3/201111/15/2011

Federal

State
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(Colo. 2011).
Moreno

v.

Gessler,

No.

11CV3461 (Denver Dist. Ct.
Dec. 5, 2011).
C

LA

5/10/2011-

State

12/5/2011

Johnson v. Ardoin, 2019 WL 6/13/201810/13/2020
4318487 (M.D. La. 2019).

Federal

Buckley v. Schedler, No. 3:13-

Federal

-

cv-00763 (M.D. La. 2013).

11/25/2013

12/16/2013
8/16/20126/19/2013

Federal

Ehlen v. Carnahan,No. 6:12-cv-

3/2/2012-

Federal

03122 (W.D. Mo. 2012).

3/13/2012

Ceasar v. Jindal, No. 6:12-cvLa. 2013);
02198 (W.D.
renumbered No. 13-30521 (5th

Cir. 2013)
C

MO

Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 9/20115/25/2012
36 (Mo. 2012).
v.

12/9/2011-

Carnahan, 357 S.W.3d 601
(Mo. 2012).

1/17/2012

Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11
(Mo. 2012)

1/27/20125/25/2012

State

C

VA

ex

rel.

Teichman

State

State

Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of 12/22/2014
Elections, 368 F. Supp. 3d 872 - 2/14/2019
(E.D. Va. 2019).

Federal

Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155

10/2/2013-

Federal

F. Supp. 3d 552 (E.D. Va. 2016).

1/7/2016

Vesilind v.

Va. State Bd of 9/14/2015-

Elections, 813 S.E.2d 739 (Va.
2018).

5/31/2018

State
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D

AR

NV
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Federal

Larry v. Arkansas, No. 4:18-cv-

2/9/2018-

00116, 2018 WL 4858956 (E.D.
Ark. Aug. 3, 2018)

1/11/2019

Jeffers v. Beebe, 895 F. Supp. 2d
920 (E.D. Ark. 2012).

1/23/20129/17/2012

Federal

Guy v. Miller, No. 11 OC 00042
1B (Nev. Dist. Ct., Carson City

2/24/201110/27/2011

State

Teijeiro v. Schneider, No. 3:11-

5/9/2011-

Federal

cv-00330 (D. Nev. 2011).

12/2/2011

Gorrell v. O'Malley, 1:11-cv-

10/27/2011
- 1/19/2012

Federal

Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S.Ct.

11/5/2013-

Federal

1942 (2018).

8/9/2019

Oct. 27, 2011)

MD

02975, 2012 WL 226919 (D.
Md. Jan. 19, 2012).

Parrott v. Lamone, No. 1:15-

6/24/2015-

cv-01849, 2016 WL 4445319
(D. Md. Aug. 24, 2016).

1/9/2017

Bouchat v. Maryland, No. 1:15-

8/14/2015-

cv-02417, 2016 WL 4699415
(D. Md. Sept. 7, 2016).

9/7/2016

Bouchat

v.

06C15068061

Maryland,

No.

(Md. Cir. Ct.,

1/2015-

Federal

Federal

Federal

5/1/2015

Carroll Cnty. May 1, 2015).
In the Matter of 2012 Legislative
Districtingof the State, 80 A.3d

3/2/201212/10/2013

State

Federal

1073 (Md. 2013).
831

11/10/2011

F.Supp.2d 887 (D. Md. 2011),
aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 29 (2012).

-6/25/2012

Martin v. Maryland, No. 1:11-

4/6/201110/27/2011

Fletcher

v.

Lamone,

cv-00904, 2011 WL 5151755

Federal
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(D. Md. Oct. 27, 2011).

F

11/29/2011

11-3443, 2012 WL 440736 (D.
Md. Feb. 9, 2012).

- 2/9/2012

Olson v. O'Malley, Misc. No. 13
(Md. Ct. Appeals Jan. 10, 2012).

11/22/2011
- 1/10/2012

State

Olson v. O'Malley, No. 1:12-cv0240, 2012 WL 764421 (D. Md.
Mar. 6, 2012).

11/22/2011
- 3/6/2012

Federal

Sexton v. Bentley, No. CV-2012-

5/16/20128/15/2012

State

Chestnutv. Merrill, 446 F. Supp.
3d 908 (2020).

6/13/20183/17/2020

Federal

Alabama Legis. Black Caucus v.

12/13/2012
- 1/20/2017

Federal

In re 2011 Redistricting Cases,

7/12/2011-

State

294 P.3d 1032, 1037-38 (Alaska
2012).

11/18/2013

No.

6/13/2018,

+

4

AL

503-TSM, 2012 WL 1749015
(Cir. Ct. Montgomery May 16,
2012.)

Alabama, 575 U.S. 254 (2015);
231 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (M.D. Ala.
2017)
F

F

F

Federal

Martin v. Maryland, No. CCB-

AK

GA

IL

Dwight

v.

Kemp,

Federal

118CV02869 (N.D. Ga. 2020).

4/14/2020

Ga. State Conf of NAACP v.
Georgia, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1357
(N.D. Ga. 2018).

4/24/20176/1/2018

Federal

Voters v.

8/16/2011-

Federal

League of Women

Quinn, No. 1:11-cv-05569, 2011
WL 5143044 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28,
2011), aff'd, 566 U.S. 1007
(2012)

5/21/2012

Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of 7/20/2011-

Elections, 836 F. Supp. 3d 759
(N.D. Ill. 2011), aff'd, 568 U.S.
801 (2012).

IN

F

KY

F

ME

MI

Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,
835 F. Supp. 2d 563 (N.D. Ill.
2011).

12/15/2011

Res.

4/26/2013-

Comm'n, 966 F. Supp. 2d 709
(E.D. Ky. 2013).

10/31/2013

Brown

v.

Ky.

Legis.

Fischer v. Grimes, No. 12-CI-

1/26/2012-

109 (Cir. Ct. Ky. 2012).

4/26/2012

Turcotte v. LePage, No. 1:11-

8/17/2011-

cv-00312, 2011 WL 6057844
(D. Me. Nov. 30, 2011).

11/30/2011

Desena v. Maine, 793 F. Supp.

3/28/2011-

2d 456 (D. Me. 2011).

7/21/2011

League of Women Voters of
Mich. v. Benson, 373 F. Supp. 3d

12/22/2017

Federal

Federal

State

Federal

Federal

Federal

-

F

Federal

10/1/2012

Comm. for a Fairand Balanced 7/27/2011-

F
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867 (E.D. Mich. 2019), rev'd 10/21/2019
sub nom. Chatfield v. League of
Women Voters of Mich., 140 S.

Ct. 429 (2019).

F

MN

NAACP v. Snyder, 879 F. Supp.

12/8/2011-

2d 662 (E.D. Mich. 2012).

4/6/2012

Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d

1/25/2011-

391 (Minn. 2012).

2/21/2012

Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d
374 (Minn. 2012).

1/25/20112/21/2012

Federal

State

State

F

F

F
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NH

NY

NC

Manchester v. Sec 'y of State, 48

4/23/2012-

A.3d 864 (N.H. 2012)

6/19/2012

State

Federal

Favors v. Cuomo, No. 1:11-cv-

11/17/2011

05632, 2012 WL 928223
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012).

- 3/19/2012

Cohen v. NY LATFOR, No.
101026/12 (NY Mar. 9, 2012).

1/31/20123/9/2012

State

Cohen v. Cuomo, 969 N.E.2d
754 (N.Y. 2012).

3/15/20125/3/2012

State

Little v. NY LA TFOR, No. 23102011 (N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012).

4/4/112/14/2012

State

12/14/2018
4/16/2020

State

Common Cause v. Lewis, No.

2019 WL
18-CVS-014001,
4569584 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake
Cnty. Sept. 3, 2019), aff'd, 956
F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2020).
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139
Ct. 2484 (2019).

-

S. 8/5/2016-

N.C. State Conference of 2/21/18NAACP Branches v. Lewis, No. 11/2/2018
18-CVS-002322 (N.C. Super.
Ct., Wake Cnty. Nov. 2, 2018)
Harrisv. McCrory, 159 F. Supp.

Federal

6/27/2019

10/24/2013

State

Federal

3d 600 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd - 5/22/2017
sub nom. Cooper v. Harris, 137

S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d
238 (N.C. 2014), vacated, 135 S.
Ct. 1843 (2015), 781 S.E.2d 404
(N.C. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct.
2186 (2017),judgment, Dickson
v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty.

11/3/20111/4/2019

State/Fede

ral
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Feb. 12, 2018).

F

ND

F

OH

Covington v. North Carolina,

5/19/2015-

316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C.
2016), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(2017), 137 S. Ct. 1624 (2017)

6/5/2017

Covington v. North Carolina,

6/9/2015-

283 F. Supp. 3d 410 (M.D.N.C.
2018).

6/28/2018

State ex rel. Ohioans for Fair 9/28/2011Districts v. Husted, 130 Ohio St. 10/27/2011

Federal

Federal

State

3d 240 (2011).
Wilson

OK

Kasich,

v.

134 Ohio

1/4/2012-

St.3d 221 (2012)

11/27/2012

Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v.

5/3/2019-

Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d
978 (S.D. Ohio 2019)

10/7/2019

Duffee v. State Question 748,

1/24/2011-

No. 0-109127 (Okla. Feb. 28,

2/28/2011

State

Federal

State

2011).

F

PA

Wilson v. Oklahoma ex rel. State

7/7/2011-

Election Bd., 270 P.3d 155
(Okla. 2012).

1/17/2012

Corman

v.

Torres,

F.

287

Supp.3d 558 (M.D. Pa. 2018).

2/22/2018-

State

Federal

9/25/2018

Agre v. Wolf, 284 F. Supp. 3d 10/2/2017591 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
6/4/2018

Federal

11/9/2017-

Federal

Diamond

v.

Torres,

No.

5:17cv05054 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9,
2018).

4/9/2018
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2/2/20123/17/2014

Federal

No.
v.
Aichele,
Smith
2:12CV00488 (E.D. Pa. May 31,
2012).

1/30/20125/31/2012

Federal

Pileggiv. Aichele, 843 F. Supp.
2d 584 (E.D. Pa. 2012).

1/30/20122/8/2012

Federal

League of Women Voters of Pa.

6/15/2017-

State

v. Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737
(Pa. 2018).

10/29/2018

In re: Petitions for Review

8/20/2012-

Challenging the Final 2011

5/8/2013

2011
Legis.
v.
Garcia
Reapportionment Comm 'n, 559

Fed. Appx. 128 (3d Cir. 2014).

State

Reapportionment Plan Dated

June 8, 2012
2011
Legis.
v.
Holt
Reapportionment Comm 'n, 38

1/10/20121/25/2012

State

3/19/2012-

State

A.3d 711 (Pa. 2012).

F

TN

TX

Moore

v.

Tennessee,

436

S.W.3d 775 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2014).

5/15/2014

5:11-cv-

5/9/2011-

00360, 2012 WL 13124275
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2012).

7/24/2019

Davis v. Perry, No.

10/17/2011

Perez v.

Texas, No.

5:11-cy-

00788 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19,
2012).
F

UT

F

WV

Tennant

v.

Jefferson

Cnty.

Comm'n, 567 U.S. 758 (2012).

Federal

Federal

-

F

11/30/2015

11/4/2011-

1/25/2013

Federal

1177
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West Virginia ex rel. Cooper v.

10/13/2011

Tennant, 730 S.E.2d 368 (W.
Va. 2012).

-

State of West Virginia ex rel.

10/21/2011

Andes v. Tennant, No. 11-1447
(W. Va. 2012).

- 2/13/2012

State of West Virginia ex rel.
County Comm'n of Monroe
County v. Tennant, No. 11-1516

11/4/20112/13/2012

State

11/4/20112/13/2012

State

11/7/20112/13/2012

State

7/8/20156/18/2018

Federal

Baldus v. Brennan, 849 F. Supp.

6/10/2011-

Federal

2d 840 (E.D. Wis. 2012).

3/22/2012

State

2/13/2012

State

(W. Va. 2012).
State of West Virginia ex rel.
Callen v. Tennant, No. 11-1517

(W. Va. 2012).
State of West Virginia ex rel.
Cooper v. Tennant, No. 11-1525

(W. Va. 2012).
F

WI

Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018), dismissed on remand
sub nom. Whitford v. Gill, No.

3:15-cv-00421 (W.D. Wis. July
2, 2019)

Wis.
Assemb.
Democratic 9/14/2018Campaign Comm. v. Gill, No. 1/29/2019

3:188cv00763
2019).

(W.D.

Wis.

Federal

